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Executive Summary 
Subject and objectives 
This evaluation has been commissioned by the Policy and Implementation Frameworks 
Unit of the Directorate-General Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection– DG ECHO – on 
behalf of the European Commission.  
 
The evaluation assesses DG ECHO’s activities in Colombia between 1 January 2007 and 
30 June 2012, with special emphasis on the last three years (2010-2012). The thematic 
scope includes DG ECHO’s humanitarian actions at both the strategic and intervention 
levels. Geographic coverage includes support provided in Colombia as well as the DG 
ECHO response to the Colombian refugees and asylum seekers in neighbouring countries, 
notably Ecuador and Venezuela. A full description of the evaluation context is given in 
Section 2 of this report. 
 
This evaluation aims at providing an overall independent assessment of DG ECHO’s 
humanitarian actions in Colombia over the evaluation period, using the different 
OECD/DAC evaluation criteria and other criteria mentioned in the Terms of Reference 
(ToR) such as the “3Cs” (coherence, coordination and complementarity) and the 23 
Principles and Good Practice of Good Humanitarian Donorship. In addition, the 
evaluation provides practical and operational recommendations for future DG ECHO 
actions in Colombia, taking into account, among other things, the changing political and 
security context in the country. 
Methodology 
The evaluation applied a rigorous methodology based notably DG ECHO’s Manual for the 
Evaluation of Humanitarian Aid and on the methodological framework of the European 
Commission external relations Joint Evaluation Unit. It designed a three-phase approach 
consisting of a desk, field and synthesis phases. The first phase was split into a structuring 
and a desk stage. It was dedicated to providing an inventory of DG ECHO humanitarian 
funding in Colombia, an overview of the context in which it took place and the 
construction of DG ECHO’s intervention logic. Five case study interventions were also 
selected during this phase. 
The intervention logic then informed the definition of the Evaluation Questions (see 
Section 3.1.2. of this report). 
 
On this basis, data collection took place through both desk and field work. The evaluation 
used a combination of tools and techniques for data collection including the analysis 
of a large amount of documents, interviews with around 46 interlocutors including 
representatives from the Commission, implementing partners, civil society, national 
authorities and other stakeholders in the field. The five case study interventions were 
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combined with desk study, the inventory of interventions, a workshop in Bogota and six 
focus groups in Colombia. Further details are presented in Section 3.2 of the report. 
Conclusions 
 
The evaluation reached a total of eight Conclusions, numbered C1-C8, and summarised in 
the following table. Conclusions are presented in full in Section 5 of this report. 
 
C1: On DG ECHO’s prioritisation of humanitarian needs  
DG ECHO support tackled the right priorities in terms of humanitarian needs in 
Colombia. To identify the humanitarian needs in Colombia and build its strategy, DG 
ECHO relied on different sources of information including national authorities, 
Colombian NGOs and universities. Furthermore, it used needs assessments conducted by 
its implementing partners, the validity of which was generally accepted. Finally, DG 
ECHO’s follow-up of the Colombian context and its close monitoring of its 
interventions, allowed it to adapt its support to needs arising from unforeseen contextual 
changes. 
C2: On the needs of unregistered IDPs and PNIPs  
Some populations that were in need and did not receive any humanitarian support 
remained out of reach, or partially out of reach, of DG ECHO’s support, as an 
indirect consequence of DG ECHO’s implementing partners choices in terms of 
eligibility criteria Indeed, in big urban centres, DG ECHO focused its support through 
its main implementing partner –ICRC- on recently displaced persons, but unregistered 
IDPs having displaced for over three months were ultimately not eligible for support 
from DG ECHO or the Colombian State. Similarly, in terms of PNIP support, DG 
ECHO’s focus was primarily, though not entirely, on registered asylum seekers and 
refugees. This, combined with changes to Ecuadorian legislation which narrowed the 
criteria for refugee status, meant that many refugees fell out of reach for DG ECHO 
support.  
C3: On the timeliness of DG ECHO’s response  
On the whole, emergency response was provided in a timely manner, in particular, 
ECHO responded quickly to the natural disasters of 2007 and 2010. The one year 
timeframe created some constraints in particular cases. Overall stakeholders agree 
that DG ECHO support was swift and provided in a timely manner. This included also 
DG ECHO addressing the urgent humanitarian needs arising from the severe flooding in 
2007 and 2010 via two ad hoc budgeting decisions specifically targeting flood victims. 
However, a lack of flexibility on project length was also felt by implementing partners as a 
constraint on coordination efforts and on the linking of relief to rehabilitation and 
development in some cases. 
C4: On the link between relief, rehabilitation and development  
DG ECHO integrated LRRD in its strategy over the evaluation period and 
implemented hand-over strategies successfully at implementation level. 
Nevertheless, LRRD was hampered by the armed conflict and the fact that the 
government is a party in conflict. There were also missed opportunities regarding 
linkages with the Commission’s development programmes. All DG ECHO’s global 
plans and HIPs for Colombia explicitly devised an approach to ensure LRRD, and the 
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evaluation observed specific success in terms of connecting DG ECHO’s support to 
longer term assistance and hand over projects to local actors. However, government of 
recipient country have a key role to play in terms of linking the relief and development 
assistance received. This is much more difficult and challenging in armed conflicts 
especially when the government is a party in conflict. In addition, DG ECHO and the 
development services of the Commission did not design their strategy jointly nor 
implement their actions in concert. The suppression of the Uprooted People thematic 
budget line in 2006 further complicated the establishment of connections between the 
two organisations. Nevertheless, DG ECHO has been able to successfully implement 
hand-over and exit strategies. 
C5: On interventions in urban settings  
When DG ECHO intervened in urban settings it showed specific types of assets. 
DG ECHO’s interventions in urban contexts addressed the right needs, were 
complementary to the Government of Colombia’s activities, contributed to increased 
accountability on the part of government authorities, and generated incentives for the 
improvements in of non-discriminatory services. In addition, DG ECHO’s community-
based and ‘cash & voucher’ approaches have also proved useful.    
C6: On donor coordination  
DG ECHO was in a position to play a leading role in terms of coordination and of 
enhancing coherence and complementarities among humanitarian actors. 
However it did not fully take up this role notably because it was not in its 
mandate. Nevertheless, complementarities were achieved at implementation level. 
Among the humanitarian donors, DG ECHO was the most important actor in terms of 
financial volume of its aid over the evaluation period. This confers DG ECHO with a 
potential leverage to play a key role in terms of coordination. At policy level, DG ECHO 
did play a supporting role in UN OCHA’s efforts to set up a common humanitarian 
support framework. At the implementation level, the inclusion of synergy-potential as a 
project selection criterion proved effective, but the one year time limit on DG ECHO 
engagements capped the level of coordination that could be developed within this 
framework.2 
C7: On factors affecting timeliness and cost-effectiveness  
Timeliness and cost-effectiveness have been impacted by both ‘internal’ and 
‘external’ factors. The consolidation plan adopted in 2007 caused the intensification of 
violence in certain regions but this is no longer an issue for the timely implementation of 
humanitarian projects. The adoption of the Presidential Decree in 2009 blurring civilian 
and military distinction led to project delays with some implementing partners. There 
were also missed opportunities in terms of concerted action between DG ECHO and the 
EUD where EUD could have built on DG ECHO expertise gained in Colombia since the 
mid-nineties, which would have benefited the efficiency of implementation. 
C8: On estimation of coverage 
Estimation of coverage is very difficult both because there was no consensus on 
the number of IDPs and because DG ECHO only monitored beneficiary 
populations reached in an aggregated manner. The lack of consensus can be 
attributed to various causes, including: questions surrounding the recognition of victims 
                                                 
2  No recommendation was formulated to address the one year time limit as this timeframe is imposed by regulation 
and cannot be changed. 
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of BACRIMs; the use of different databases by different organisations; specific difficulties 
related to determining the exact number of beneficiaries for multi-donor interventions; 
the fact that persons who have been repeatedly displaced are not recounted; the difficulty 
of counting direct beneficiaries when speaking of massive displacements; victims that 
remain anonymous through choice or otherwise. While DG ECHO provides 
disaggregated figures on targets at the planning stage, the monitoring of beneficiaries 
reached is not undertaken according to the same indicators.  
Recommendations 
On the basis of the above conclusions and the answer to the evaluation questions, 11 
recommendations were made for future DG ECHO actions in Colombia. The 
recommendations spanned the following areas: 
 Areas where DG ECHO may provide an added value in the coming 1-3 years; 
 The main improvements to be considered by DG ECHO in future actions; 
 Measures to reinforce DG ECHO coordination with partners and other donors; 
 DG ECHO’s potential role in urban violent contexts; 
 Improving DG ECHO’s actions addressing humanitarian needs of vulnerable groups. 
 
The table below summarises each Recommendation, which are presented in full detail in 
Section 6 of this report. The table also lists the Conclusions on which each 
Recommendation was based. 
 
Recommendation Origin
Areas where DG ECHO may provide an added value in the coming 1-3 years 
R1: Increase coverage of IDPs in the short-term. The passing of the Victims Law, 
the institutional restructuration and high turnover of government officials in Colombia 
mean that there will be a transition period before Colombian government authorities 
can fulfil its responsibilities with regard to IDPs. Given the size of its presence in 
Colombia, DG ECHO would be well placed to provide additional support to IDPs 
during this transition period. 
C1 
R2: Increase coverage of non-registered IDPs in Colombia and non-registered 
PNIPs in neighbouring countries. Acknowledging that DG ECHO does not intend 
to cover all humanitarian needs in Colombia, it should nevertheless consider ways to 
increase the share of DG ECHO support to non-registered victims both within 
Colombia and in neighbouring countries in order to increase coverage of groups not 
reached by the authorities or other international organisations. 
C2 
The main improvements to be considered by DG ECHO in future actions 
R3: Improve monitoring of DG ECHO coverage. In order to better monitor DG 
ECHO’s efficiency in reaching its strategic targets, and thus to inform future planning, 
a review of data collection procedures should be considered. In particular, it is 
recommended that DG ECHO seeks to build a consolidated database of persons 
supported by DG ECHO funded operations, cross-referenced against the share of DG 
ECHO support provided for multi-donor engagements.   
C8 
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R4: Enhance LRRD by increased coordination with the development services of 
the European Commission. LRRD should be addressed by focusing on government 
institutions. Nevertheless, it is recommended that, as part of its commitment to LRRD, 
DG ECHO increases dialogue and coordination with the Commission development 
services, not only at the strategic level, but also in terms of project-level knowledge-
sharing regarding, e.g., projects funded by the Instrument for Stability and the 
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights.  
C4 
Measures to reinforce DG ECHO coordination with partners and other donors 
R5: DG ECHO should exploit the added-value that it has in pushing for 
coordination. DG ECHO was the most important humanitarian donor financially, the 
EU has committed to stronger coordination, and DG ECHO has had a key role in 
keeping humanitarian needs visible. These aspects confer DG ECHO an added-value 
in coordinating humanitarian assistance even though it does not have such mandate. 
DG ECHO should therefore exploit such added-value especially in the transition 
period before the new institutions of the Colombian government can play their leading 
role in this respect. 
C6 
R6: Support coordination efforts of UNHCR in neighbouring countries. The 
absence of a cluster system in Ecuador created a need for increased coherence and 
complementarity between humanitarian actors dealing with the Colombian refuges and 
asylum seekers in this country. The evaluation recommends that DG ECHO supports 
efforts by UNHCR to set up a mechanism for coherence and complementarity with 
other partners such as the joint WFP, UNHCR, OXFAM project.  
C6 
DG ECHO’s potential role in urban violent contexts 
R7: Using DG ECHO’s leverage to draw attention to the need for interventions 
in urban settings. The evaluation recommends that DG ECHO seeks to shape the 
humanitarian agenda and draw attention to the needs for interventions in urban 
settings. It should start to build up institutional know-how on its interventions in urban 
settings in the region in particular in the field of Protection. That could provide DG 
ECHO with an edge on addressing upcoming humanitarian trends and demonstrate 
leadership. To achieve this, DG ECHO resources would have to be increased to 
address the urban humanitarian needs portfolio whilst maintaining the rural portfolio. 
C5 
C6 
R8: Consider increasing funding for support in urban contexts. In addition to the 
advocacy role outlined in recommendation 7 above, the evaluation also recommends 
that DG ECHO consider increasing its portfolio of activities in urban areas, whilst 
simultaneously maintaining its vital support in rural areas. The evaluation recommends 
that DG ECHO considers the full range of potential approaches, including, as a 
starting point: exploring a sectoral approach to Protection in urban contexts; learning 
from best practice in providing humanitarian support in urban settings; and facilitating 
discussions on the use of “cash & voucher” approaches. 
C5 
R9: DG ECHO should engage further in Protection interventions in urban 
settings. DG ECHO should strive to address protection needs in urban settings of 
victims excluded by the Victims Law, especially Children and Youth. It should do so 
by creating alternative humanitarian spaces and strengthening the so-called “Attention 
or Protection Roads”. It should geographically base its interventions on relevant 
criteria measuring humanitarian consequences of urban violence. 
C5 
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Improving DG ECHO’s actions addressing humanitarian needs of vulnerable groups: 
R10: Continue supporting the community/neighbourhood approach to basic 
needs support. As noted in EQ3 and EQ5, DG ECHO interventions in urban 
settings used a community approach to basic needs support proved successful in preventing 
further discrimination and allowing identification of Protection cases among vulnerable 
groups, including in particular children and adolescents at risk of forced recruitment or 
abuse. The evaluation recommends that this approach is continued and prioritised in 
future support in urban contexts whenever appropriate. 
C5 
R11: DG ECHO should continue to encourage implementing partners to have a 
differentiated approach to vulnerable groups: Specific risks of discrimination arise 
for vulnerable groups, particularly in urban contexts. Accordingly, the evaluation 
recommends that DG ECHO should continue to encourage its implementing partners 
in designing interventions that have a differentiated approach to indigenous 
communities, Afro-Colombians, women, elders and disabled, in order not to reproduce 
discrimination and exclusion schemes. 
C6 
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Resumen ejecutivo 
Tema y objetivos 
La presente evaluación ha sido encargada por la Unidad de Marcos de Política y de 
Aplicación de la Dirección General de Ayuda Humanitaria y Protección Civil (DG ECHO), 
en nombre de la Comisión Europea.  
 
La evaluación realiza un análisis de las actividades de la DG ECHO en Colombia entre el 1 
de enero de 2007 y el 30 de junio de 2012, prestando especial atención a los últimos tres 
años (2010-2012). Entre los temas evaluados se incluyen las acciones humanitarias de la 
DG ECHO tanto a nivel estratégico como de intervención. La cobertura geográfica incluye 
el apoyo proporcionado en Colombia, así como la respuesta de la DG ECHO a los 
refugiados y los solicitantes de asilo colombianos en los países vecinos, especialmente 
Ecuador y Venezuela. En la Sección 2 del presente informe ofrecemos una descripción 
exhaustiva del contexto evaluado. 
 
Esta evaluación pretende proporcionar una valoración global independiente  de las 
acciones humanitarias de la DG ECHO en Colombia a lo largo del periodo de evaluación, 
utilizando diversos criterios de evaluación de la OCDE/CAD y otros criterios 
mencionados en los Términos de Referencia (TdR), como las "3C" (coherencia, 
coordinación y complementariedad) y los 23 Principios y Buenas Prácticas de una Buena 
Donación Humanitaria. Asimismo, la evaluación proporciona recomendaciones 
prácticas y operacionales para futuras acciones de la DG ECHO en Colombia, teniendo 
en cuenta, entre otras cosas, el cambiante contexto político y de seguridad del país. 
Metodología 
Para la evaluación se ha utilizado una rigurosa metodología basada principalmente en el 
Manual para la Evaluación de la Ayuda Humanitaria de la DG ECHO y en el marco 
metodológico de la Unidad de Evaluación Conjunta de relaciones exteriores de la Comisión 
Europea. Se ha diseñado un enfoque de tres fases: fase de documentación, fase de campo 
y fase de síntesis. La primera fase se dividió en una subfase de estructuración y una subfase 
de documentación. Su objetivo era proporcionar un inventario de la financiación 
humanitaria de la DG ECHO en Colombia, una vista general del contexto en el que tuvo 
lugar y el establecimiento de una lógica de intervención de la DG ECHO. Durante esta fase 
también se seleccionaron cinco intervenciones de estudios de casos concretos. 
A continuación, la lógica de la intervención sirvió de base para definir las Preguntas de 
Evaluación (véase la Sección 3.1.2. del presente informe). 
 
Sobre esta base, se realizó una recopilación de datos tanto mediante un trabajo de 
documentación como de campo. Para la evaluación se utilizó una combinación de 
herramientas y técnicas de recopilación de datos que incluían el análisis de una gran 
cantidad de documentos, así como entrevistas a alrededor de 46 interlocutores, entre ellos 
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representantes de la Comisión, las contrapartes ejecutantes, la sociedad civil, autoridades 
nacionales y otros actores de este ámbito. Las cinco intervenciones de estudios de casos se 
combinaron con un estudio documental, un inventario de las intervenciones, un taller en 
Bogotá y seis grupos de discusión en Colombia. Para más detalles, véase la Sección 3.2. del 
informe. 
Conclusiones 
 
La evaluación alcanzó un total de ocho Conclusiones, numeradas de C1 a C8, y resumidas 
en la tabla siguiente. En la Sección 5 del presente informe se presentan las conclusiones 
íntegras. 
 
C1: Sobre la priorización de la DG ECHO de las necesidades humanitarias  
El apoyo de la DG ECHO abordó las prioridades adecuadas en términos de 
necesidades humanitarias en Colombia. Con vistas a identificar las necesidades 
humanitarias en Colombia y establecer su estrategia, la DG ECHO se basó en varias 
fuentes de información, entre las que se encontraban autoridades nacionales y ONG y 
universidades colombianas. Por otro lado, utilizó evaluaciones de necesidades llevadas a 
cabo por la contraparte ejecutante, cuya validez ya había sido aceptada de forma general. 
Por último, el seguimiento de la DG ECHO en torno al contexto colombiano y la 
monitorización exhaustiva de sus intervenciones, le permitieron adaptar su apoyo a las 
necesidades surgidas de cambios contextuales inesperados. 
C2: Sobre las necesidades de las PDI y PNPI  
Algunas poblaciones en situación de necesidad y que no recibieron ningún apoyo 
humanitario quedaron total o parcialmente al margen del apoyo de la DG ECHO 
como consecuencia indirecta de las elecciones que tomarón las contrapartes 
ejecutantes de la DG ECHO en términos de criterios de elegibilidad. De hecho, en 
los grandes centros urbanos, la DG ECHO centró su apoyo a través de su principal socio 
de ejecución – ICRC – en las personas desplazadas recientemente, pero las PDI no 
registradas y desplazadas durante más de tres meses no eran susceptibles de ser elegidas 
para recibir el apoyo de la DG ECHO ni del estado colombiano. De igual modo, en lo 
que a apoyo a las PNPI se refiere, la DG ECHO se centró principalmente, si bien no 
exclusivamente, en los solicitantes de asilo y los refugiados registrados. Todo ello 
combinado con los cambios en la legislación ecuatoriana, que ha limitado los criterios para 
obtener la condición de refugiado, lo que ha implicado que muchos refugiados queden 
fuera del alcance del apoyo de la DG ECHO.  
C3: Sobre el plazo de respuesta de la DG ECHO  
En general, la respuesta de emergencia se proporcionó en un plazo oportuno; más 
concretamente, la ECHO respondió rápidamente a los desastres naturales de 2007 
y 2010. El plazo de un año conllevó algunas limitaciones en casos particulares. En 
general, los actores están de acuerdo en que el apoyo de la DG ECHO fue rápido y se 
proporcionó en un plazo oportuno. Ello incluyó también la respuesta de la DG ECHO a 
las necesidades humanitarias urgentes durante las graves inundaciones de 2007 y 2010 a 
través de dos decisiones presupuestarias ad hoc específicas para ayudar a las víctimas de 
ambas catástrofes. No obstante, las contrapartes ejecutantes también percibieron la falta 
de flexibilidad en la extensión del proyecto como una limitación en los esfuerzos de 
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coordinación y en la vinculación entre la ayuda para la rehabilitación y el desarrollo en 
algunos casos. 
C4: Vinculación entre la ayuda, la rehabilitación y el desarrollo  
La DG ECHO integró la VARD en su estrategia a lo largo del periodo de 
evaluación y aplicó satisfactoriamente estrategias de traspaso de responsabilidades 
en la práctica. Sin embargo, la VARD se vio dificultada por el conflicto armado y el 
hecho de que el gobierno fuera parte del mismo. También hubo oportunidades 
perdidas en torno a las conexiones con los programas de desarrollo de la 
Comisión. Todos los planes globales y los HIP de la DG ECHO para Colombia 
establecieron explícitamente un enfoque para garantizar la VARD, y con su evaluación se 
observó un éxito específico en la vinculación del apoyo de la DG ECHO a la ayuda a más 
largo plazo y el traspaso de los proyectos a los actores locales. No obstante, el gobierno 
del país receptor desempeña un papel clave a la hora de vincular la ayuda general con la 
ayuda al desarrollo recibida. Esta tarea es mucho más complicada y exige mucho más 
esfuerzo en los casos de conflicto armado, especialmente si el gobierno es parte del 
conflicto. Además, la DG ECHO y los servicios de desarrollo de la Comisión no 
diseñaron su estrategia ni pusieron en práctica sus acciones de forma conjunta. La 
supresión de la línea presupuestaria para Poblaciones Desarraigadas en 2006, complicó 
todavía más el establecimiento de conexiones entre las dos organizaciones. No obstante, la 
DG ECHO ha sido capaz de aplicar satisfactoriamente estrategias de traspaso de 
responsabilidades y de salida. 
C5: Sobre las intervenciones en entornos urbanos  
Cuando la DG ECHO intervino en entornos urbanos, mostró tipos específicos de 
ventajas. Las intervenciones de la DG ECHO en contextos urbanos abordaron las 
necesidades adecuadas, complementaron las actividades del Gobierno de Colombia, 
contribuyeron a incrementar la responsabilidad de las autoridades gubernamentales y 
generaron incentivos de mejora en servicios no discriminatorios. Además, también 
demostraron su utilidad los enfoques de la DG ECHO basados en la comunidad y "cash 
& voucher".    
C6: Sobre la coordinación de los donantes  
La DG ECHO tenía la posibilidad de jugar un papel de liderazgo en términos de 
coordinación y reforzar la coherencia y las complementariedades entre actores 
humanitarios.  Sin embargo, no pudo tomar totalmente ese papel en particular 
porque no se encontraba en su mandato.  A pesar de ello las complementariedades 
pudieron lograrse a nivel de la implementación.  Entre los donantes humanitarios, la 
DG ECHO fue el actor más importante en términos de volumen financiero de su ayuda a 
lo largo de todo el periodo de evaluación. Ello confiere a la DG ECHO una influencia 
potencial para desempeñar un papel clave en materia de coordinación. A nivel político, la 
DG ECHO desempeñó un papel de apoyo en los esfuerzos de la OCHA para establecer 
un marco común de apoyo humanitario. A nivel práctico, la inclusión del potencial de 
sinergia como criterio de selección de los proyectos demostró ser un factor efectivo, pero 
el límite de un año en los compromisos con la DG ECHO restringió el nivel de 
coordinación que se podría haber alcanzado en este marco.3 
                                                 
3  No se formularon recomendaciones en torno al límite de un año, ya que este plazo está impuesto por ley y no se 
puede modificar. 
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C7: Sobre los factores que afectan a los plazos y la rentabilidad  
Los plazos y la rentabilidad han sufrido un impacto debido a factores tanto 
"internos" como "externos". El plan de consolidación adoptado en 2007 provocó la 
intensificación de la violencia en varias regiones pero ello ha dejado de ser un problema 
para poner en práctica los proyectos humanitarios dentro de un plazo oportuno. La 
adopción del Decreto Presidencial en 2009, con el que se difumina la distinción civil y 
militar, llevó a retrasos en el proyecto por parte de algunas contrapartes ejecutantes. 
También hubo oportunidades perdidas en términos de acción conjunta entre la DG 
ECHO y la DUE. La DUE podría haber aprovechado la experiencia que la DG ECHO 
ha adquirido en Colombia desde mediados de los noventa, y que podría haber beneficiado 
la eficiencia de la implementación. 
C8: Sobre la valoración de la cobertura 
La valoración de la cobertura es muy compleja, tanto porque no se llegó a un 
consenso sobre el número de PDI como porque la DG ECHO sólo evaluó las 
poblaciones beneficiarias alcanzadas en conjunto. La falta de consenso se puede 
atribuir a varias causas, entre ellas: cuestiones sobre el reconocimiento de víctimas de las 
BACRIM; el uso de bases de datos diferentes por parte de las diferentes organizaciones; 
dificultades específicas relacionadas con la determinación del número exacto de 
beneficiarios de las intervenciones de donantes múltiples; el hecho de que las personas 
desplazadas en repetidas ocasiones no se vuelvan a contabilizar; la dificultad de 
contabilizar los beneficiarios directos en el caso de los desplazamientos masivos; las 
víctimas que permanecen anónimas por elección u otros motivos. A pesar de que la DG 
ECHO proporciona cifras disgregadas sobre objetivos en la fase de planificación, la 
evaluación de los beneficiarios realizada no se ha llevado a cabo de acuerdo con los 
mismos indicadores.  
Recomendaciones 
Sobre la base de las conclusiones arriba presentadas y la respuesta a las preguntas de 
evaluación, se han realizado 11 recomendaciones para futuras acciones de la DG ECHO en 
Colombia. Las recomendaciones abarcaron los ámbitos siguientes: 
 Ámbitos en los que la DG ECHO puede proporcionar un valor añadido en los 
próximos 1-3 años; 
 La DG ECHO debe considerar las principales mejoras en sus futuras acciones; 
 Medidas para reforzar la coordinación de la DG ECHO con sus socios y otros 
donantes; 
 El papel potencial de la DG ECHO en contextos urbanos violentos; 
 Mejorar las acciones de la DG ECHO en torno a las necesidades humanitarias de los 
grupos vulnerables. 
 
La tabla mostrada a continuación resume cada Recomendación. Las recomendaciones 
íntegras se presentan en la Sección 6 del presente informe. La tabla también incluye las 
Conclusiones en las que se basa cada Recomendación. 
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Recomendación Origen
Ámbitos en los que la DG ECHO puede proporcionar un valor añadido en los próximos 
1-3 años 
R1: Mayor cobertura de las PDI a corto plazo. La aprobación de la Ley de 
Víctimas, la restructuración institucional y los altos honorarios de los representantes 
del gobierno de Colombia tendrán como resultado que haya un periodo de transición 
antes de que las autoridades del gobierno colombiano puedan cumplir con sus 
responsabilidades con respecto de las PDI. Dado el alcance de su presencia en 
Colombia, la DG ECHO estaría bien posicionada para proporcionar apoyo adicional a 
las PDI durante este periodo de transición. 
C1 
R2: Incremento de la cobertura de PDI no registradas en Colombia y PNPI no 
registradas en países vecinos. Partiendo del hecho de que la DG ECHO no 
pretende cubrir todas las necesidades humanitarias en Colombia, sí debería considerar 
vías para incrementar el índice de apoyo a las víctimas no registradas, tanto dentro de 
Colombia como en los países vecinos, con vistas a incrementar la cobertura de los 
grupos a los que no llegan las autoridades u otras organizaciones internacionales. 
C2 
La DG ECHO debe considerar las principales mejoras en sus futuras acciones 
R3: Mejorar la supervisión de la cobertura de la DG ECHO. Con vistas a 
supervisar mejor la eficiencia de la DG ECHO a la hora de alcanzar sus objetivos 
estratégicos y, por lo tanto, informar sobre planificaciones futuras, se debería 
considerar la posibilidad de realizar una revisión de los procedimientos de recopilación 
de datos. En particular, se recomienda que la DG ECHO intente crear una base de 
datos consolidada de personas que reciben apoyo de las operaciones financiadas por la 
DG ECHO, contrastada con el índice de apoyo de la DG ECHO proporcionado para 
compromisos de donantes múltiples.   
C8 
 
R4: Mejorar la VARD mediante una mayor coordinación con los servicios de 
desarrollo de la Comisión Europea. La VARD debería abordarse centrándose en las 
instituciones gubernamentales. Sin embargo, se recomienda que, como parte de este 
compromiso con la VARD, la DG ECHO refuerce el diálogo y la coordinación con los 
servicios de desarrollo de la Comisión, no sólo a nivel estratégico, sino también en 
relación con el intercambio de conocimientos a nivel de proyecto, p.ej. proyectos 
financiados por el Instrumento para la Estabilidad y el Instrumento Europeo para la 
Democracia y los Derechos Humanos.  
C4 
Medidas para reforzar la coordinación de la DG ECHO con sus socios y otros donantes 
R5: La DG ECHO debería explotar su valor añadido a la hora de fomentar la 
coordinación. La DG ECHO fue el donante humanitario más importante en términos 
financieros, la UE se ha comprometido a alcanzar una coordinación más estrecha, y la 
DG ECHO ha desempeñado un papel clave a la hora de mantener visibles las 
necesidades humanitarias. Estos aspectos confieren a la DG ECHO un valor añadido a 
la hora de coordinar la ayuda humanitaria incluso aunque no posea ese mandato. Por lo 
tanto, la DG ECHO debería explotar este valor añadido, especialmente en el periodo 
de transición antes de que las nuevas instituciones del gobierno colombiano puedan 
desempeñar su papel de liderazgo en este sentido. 
C6 
R6: Esfuerzos de apoyo a la coordinación de ACNUR en los países vecinos La 
ausencia de un enfoque temático en Ecuador creó la necesidad de buscar una mayor 
coherencia y complementariedad entre los actores humanitarios que tratan con los 
refugiados y los solicitantes de asilo colombianos en este país. La evaluación 
recomienda que la DG ECHO apoye los esfuerzos de ACNUR para establecer un 
mecanismo de coherencia y complementariedad con otros socios, como el proyecto 
C6 
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conjunto PMA/ACNUR/OXFAM.  
El papel potencial de la DG ECHO en contextos urbanos violentos 
R7: Utilizar la influencia de la DG ECHO para llamar la atención sobre la 
necesidad de realizar intervenciones en los entornos urbanos. La evaluación 
recomienda que la DG ECHO intente configurar la agenda humanitaria y llamar la 
atención sobre las necesidades de realizar intervenciones en los entornos urbanos. 
Debería comenzar adquiriendo conocimientos específicos institucionales sobre sus 
intervenciones en entornos urbanos en la región concretamente en el ámbito de la 
Protección. Ello podría proporcionar a la DG ECHO una ventaja para abordar las 
próximas tendencias humanitarias y demostrar liderazgo. Para conseguirlo, los recursos 
de la DG ECHO deberían incrementarse con vistas a abordar las necesidades 
humanitarias urbanas al mismo tiempo que se mantiene la cartera rural. 
C5 
C6 
R8: Considerar un incremento en la financiación para apoyar contextos 
urbanos. Además del papel de defensa citado en la recomendación 7 de arriba, la 
evaluación también recomienda que la DG ECHO considere un incremento de su 
cartera de actividades en zonas urbanas, al tiempo que mantiene su apoyo básico en las 
zonas rurales. La evaluación recomienda que la DG ECHO considere todo el abanico 
de enfoques potenciales, incluidos, como punto de partida: explorar un enfoque 
sectorial de Protección en contextos urbanos; aprender de las buenas prácticas 
existentes a la hora de proporcionar apoyo humanitario en entornos urbanos; y facilitar 
el debate sobre el uso de enfoques "cash & voucher". 
C5 
R9: La DG ECHO debería comprometerse en futuras intervenciones sobre 
Protección en los entornos urbanos. La DG ECHO debería esforzarse por abordar 
las necesidades de protección en los entornos urbanos de las víctimas excluidas por la 
Ley de Víctimas, especialmente los niños y los jóvenes. Debería hacerlo creando 
espacios humanitarios alternativos y reforzando las llamadas "Rutas de Atención o 
Protección". Debería basar geográficamente sus intervenciones en criterios relevantes 
que midan las consecuencias humanitarias de la violencia urbana. 
C5 
Mejorar las acciones de la DG ECHO en torno a las necesidades humanitarias de los 
grupos vulnerables: 
R10: Continuar defendiendo el enfoque de apoyo comunitario/de vecindario a 
las necesidades básicas. Tal y como se ha señalado en EQ3 y EQ5, las 
intervenciones de la DG ECHO en entornos urbanos utilizaron un enfoque comunitario de 
apoyo a las necesidades básicas que se había demostrado satisfactorio para prevenir una 
mayor discriminación y que permitía la identificación de casos de Protección entre 
grupos vulnerables, incluidos en particular los niños y los adolescentes en riesgo de 
reclutamiento forzado o abuso. La evaluación recomienda que se continúe con este 
enfoque y se tome como prioritario en el futuro apoyo en contextos urbanos en los 
casos apropiados. 
C5 
R11: La DG ECHO debería continuar a animar las contrapartes ejecutantes a 
tener un enfoque diferenciado para con los grupos vulnerables: los riesgos 
específicos de discriminación afectan a los grupos vulnerables, particularmente en 
contextos urbanos. Por ello, la evaluación recomienda que la DG ECHO continue a 
apoyar a sus contrapartes ejecutantes en el diseño de intervenciones que permitan un 
enfoque diferenciado a las comunidades indígenas, afrocolombianas, las mujeres, los 
mayores de edad y discapacitados, con vistas a no reproducir los esquemas de 
discriminación y exclusión.  
C6 
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1. Introduction 
This document is the Draft Final Report of the “Evaluation of European Union’s Humanitarian 
activities in Colombia”, commissioned by the Policy and Implementation Frameworks Unit of 
the Directorate-General Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection –DG ECHO.  
1.1 Objectives and scope of the evaluation 
The subject of this evaluation is DG ECHO’s activities in Colombia. 
 
The objectives of this evaluation can be summarised as follows: 
 To provide an overall independent assessment of DG ECHO’s humanitarian 
actions in Colombia, using the different OECD/DAC evaluation criteria and other 
criteria mentioned in the ToR such as the 3Cs, the 23 Principles and Good Practice of 
Good Humanitarian Donorship4; 
 To provide practical and operational recommendations for future assessments and 
actions. 
 
In terms of scope, the evaluation covers the following:  
 thematic scope: DG ECHO’s humanitarian actions at both strategic and intervention 
levels; 
 geographical scope: mainly Colombia, even though the field phase will also include a trip to 
Ecuador to address the issue of refugees and asylum seekers; and 
 temporal scope: from 1 January 2007 to 30 June 2012, with a special emphasis on the last 
three years (2010-2012).  
1.2 The overall evaluation process 
The overall evaluation process was based on a transparent communication approach 
involving DG ECHO, the office of DG ECHO and the EU Delegation in Colombia and 
the implementing partners of DG ECHO. It was structured in four main phases as 
summarised in the figure below. 
The figure presents the activities undertaken in the different phases; the meetings held 
with DG ECHO in Brussels and Bogotá; and the various deliverables produced at the 
different stages. 
 
                                                 
4  DG DG ECHO, Terms of Reference – Evaluation of European Commission’s Humanitarian Activities in Colombia, 2012, p. 6. 
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Figure 1 - Evaluation phases 
 
1.3  The Draft Final Report 
This draft final report is structured as follows: 
 
 Chapter 1: Introduction: this chapter briefly presented the framework of this 
evaluation, the mandate and scope of the evaluation, and the key evaluation stages; 
 Chapter 2: Context and EU’s humanitarian support to Colombia: this chapter 
describes the socio-political context in Colombia and DG ECHO’s approach to 
tackling humanitarian needs related to the scope of the evaluation; 
 Chapter 3: Methodology: this chapter details the methodological approach, the tools 
and the sources of information used during the evaluation, and the limitations of the 
analysis;  
 Chapter 4: Answers to the Evaluation Questions: this Chapter presents, for each of 
the seven EQs, a summary box and the detailed answer; 
 Chapter 5: Conclusions of the evaluation; and 
 Chapter 6: Recommendations from the evaluation. 
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2. Context and DG ECHO’s 
humanitarian support to Colombia  
This chapter provides a descriptive overview of the evolving country context, the 
humanitarian needs and the EU’s humanitarian support provided over the evaluation 
period. It is structured as follows: 
 Section 2.1 presents a concise overview of the evolving country context including:  
- conflict dynamics;  
- occurrence of natural disasters; and  
- the legal and institutional responses. 
 Section 2.2 presents the humanitarian needs and the assistance delivered by DG 
ECHO.  
2.1 The evolving country context 
The context of humanitarian support to Colombia evolved significantly over the evaluation 
period. Notable changes to the conflict dynamics driving the country’s decades-long period 
of violence occurred over the evaluation period, starting with the Consolidation Plan 
launched by President Uribe in 2007, and continuing through 2007-2012 with the rise of 
new conflict participants and sources. Serious flooding occurred in 2007 and 2010, creating 
a sudden and unexpected humanitarian need in the country. In addition the legal and 
institutional changes that followed the passing of the Victim’s Law in 2010 had significant 
implications for the humanitarian response to internally displaced persons and other 
victims of the conflict.  
 
This section provides a brief overview of these trends so as to contextualize the 
evaluation’s analysis of the humanitarian needs and DG ECHO’s response to them. 
2.1.1  Overview 
Colombia is one of the most violent countries in the world. The Global Peace Index 
2012 rankings place Colombia in a comparable position to Yemen and Chad in 2012.5  
Despite certain improvements in security and a significant drop in homicide rates (from 64 
per year per 100,000 inhabitants to 33 in 2011), violence is still a massive phenomenon in 
both rural and urban contexts. As described briefly in section 2.1.2. below, Colombia’s 
violence stems from a long and complex conflict, with multiple actors and shifting 
dynamics. 
 
Colombia is also prone to natural disasters, notably hydro-meteorological events. 
Heavy flooding occurred on two occasions during the evaluation period – in 2007 and late 
                                                 
5  Institue for Economics and Peace, Global Peace Index 2012. http://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/2012-GPI-Map-with-Rankings-and-Scores.pdf 
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2010. As outlined in the following section, this creates a humanitarian need in its own right, 
as well as compounding the humanitarian impacts of the conflict. 
 
The legal and institutional framework has changed significantly during the 
evaluation period. Since Juan Manuel Santos took over as president in August 2010, 
important reforms were initiated to improve the GoC’s response to the longstanding 
humanitarian challenges that the country faces. This improvement has not yet materialised 
as the new institutions are still in a transition period. As explained in section 2.1.2. below, 
the evaluation has given extra weighting to the most recent years of the evaluation period in 
order to take into consideration this changing context and what it has implied or will imply 
for the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in Colombia. 
2.1.2  The evolving conflict and the occurrence of natural disasters 
The Colombian crisis is characterised by a more complex and changing set of conflict 
dynamics than is sometimes recognised. Key elements in the conflict include: 
 A long history of conflict: the violence in Colombia has its roots in the so-called 
violence decade of 1948-1958. Since that time the conflict has passed through several 
distinct phases, but the level of violence has remained high. 
 A wide range of conflict actors: the major actors include the guerrilla groups that 
emerged in the 1960s, the paramilitary groups that began to oppose them in the 1980s, 
and finally the BACRIMs that formed in the mid-2000s following the demobilisation of 
the paramilitary United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), between 2003 and 
2006.6 In addition these groups have developed ambivalent relationships among 
themselves. While they may be in opposition in one region, they may “divide” the 
territory in another or even establish working relations -  for example to deal in drugs – 
in yet another context. 
 Shifting conflict dynamics: Following the Consolidation Plan launched by President 
Uribe in 2007 to expand State control over the territory, the traditional conflict against 
the FARC has moved further to the South. The guerillas have retreated to mountainous 
areas that are less accessible but at the same time they have increasingly relied on hit-
and-run raids with strong impact on civilians. While between 2008 and 2011 BACRIMs 
were those responsible for most of the unilateral violent acts, in 2011 the pattern was 
reversed and the FARC was again responsible for most of these acts.7 In addition, the 
conflict is still intense at the borders. 
 Changing conflict sources: the conflict in Colombia is no longer fueled exclusively 
by drugs. With the global economic crisis, the price of gold and other minerals have 
drastically increased and they have now become another source of funding for the 
conflict.8 This also means that the conflict has intensified in these mining regions.9  
                                                 
6  While establishment of a link between the former paramilitaries and the BACRIMs used to be contested (hence the 
use of the term « BACRIM » criminal gangs as opposed to neo-paramilitaries), this link is now established by a 
majority of analysts and academics in Colombia. See Restrepo, Jorge et al., “Paramilitarismo: la amenaza sigue viva”, 
Razón Pública, 7 March 2011; International Crisis Group, “Dismantling Colombia’s New Illegal Armed Groups: 
Lessons form a Surender”, Latin American Report n°41, June 2012. 
7  Centro de Recursos para el Análisis de Conflictos (CERAC), Database Colombian Armed Conflict V11.3 preliminary 
information subject to revisión and actualisation.  
8  Evaluation team interview, ICRC, Cali, 8 August 2012. 
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Colombia is also prone to natural disasters, particularly hydro-meteorological events. 
Heavy flooding occurred in 2007 and late 2010. In the latter case of the La Niña 
phenomenon, more than 3.2 million people were affected, 1.35 million hectares of 
agricultural land were flooded, and thousands of roads were damaged.10 As well as 
exacerbating the humanitarian implications of the conflict, the flood created acute 
additional problems including a need for food and non-food emergency aid, provision of 
primary health care and access to safe water and sanitation (see below).  
2.1.3 Legal and institutional responses 
Since Juan Manuel Santos took over as president in August 2010 important reforms have 
been initiated in order to improve the GoC’s response to the longstanding humanitarian 
challenges that the country faces. The State finally recognized that Colombia has an 
“internal armed conflict” and also acknowledged the responsibility of the State in 
part of the victimization. In June 2011 a law was passed to compensate victims of civil 
conflict and to return land to millions of displaced people. In addition the GoC 
implemented important institutional reforms such as the establishment of a new office for 
coordination of international aid at a high hierarchical level (APC); the dissolution of 
Acción Social that used to be responsible for attending IDPs but which had many other 
responsibilities; and creation of a new institutional framework for implementing the 
Victims Law, that is the Victims Unit which depends on a new and empowered 
Department for Social Prosperity. A Risk Management Unit was also created to address 
emergencies in the event of natural disasters.  The GoC has coupled these legal and 
institutional measures with significant financial efforts: with an estimated total €200 million 
per year at present, it is now 15 times as great as the average annual DG ECHO budget for 
Colombia.11 
 
These are important changes and yet, as described in this report, they have not yet 
impacted on IDPs and other victims of the conflict. One explanation is that these legal 
and institutional reforms have undermined, at least in the short-term, the capacity of the 
Colombian State to provide humanitarian assistance. The new Victims Law requires that 
local authorities be responsible for assisting IDPs during the first 90 days of displacement 
and this has laid a considerable administrative burden on UAOs which have had problems 
registering and coping with the flow of IDPs. In October 2011, the Constitutional Court 
upheld its 2004 ruling that the government’s response to internal displacement amounted 
to an “unconstitutional state of affairs.”12 The Court ordered the government to adopt a 
wide range of measures and report on their implementation and outcomes. A congressional 
commission monitors implementation of the Victims Law, and there are discussions on the 
role of local governments and the restrictive conception of who should be considered a 
victim. Currently victims of the BACRIMs cannot benefit from the Victims Law. 
                                                                                                                                               
9  Comparison made by CODHES between the map of mining regions in Colombia and the map of the municipalities 
that have expelled most people per 100 inhabitants in 2010. CODHES, “¿Consolidación de Qué?” Boletín 
Informativo n°77, Bogotá, 15 February 2011, Annexes 2 and 4. 
10  Refugees International, Colombia: Flood Response Improves, But Challenges Remain, March 2012. 
http://refugeesinternational.org/policy/field-report/colombia-flood-response-improves-challenges-remain 
11  European Commission, Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Colombia, 2012. 
12 Constitutional Court of Colombia, Auto 219, 13 October 2011. 
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Another important political change following the election of President Santos was the 
normalisation of diplomatic relations between Colombia and its neighbouring countries 
Ecuador and Venezuela both of whom receive large numbers of asylum seekers and 
refugees.   
 
The evaluation has therefore put extra emphasis on the most recent years of the 
evaluation period so as to take into consideration this changing context and what it 
has implied or will imply for the European Union’s humanitarian assistance in Colombia.   
2.2 Humanitarian needs and assistance delivered by DG ECHO  
2.2.1  Humanitarian needs 
The violence has led to both forced displacement and confinement. Forced displacement 
here includes both internally displaced persons (IDPs) and asylum seekers and refugees 
from Colombia in neighbouring countries. According to different sources the IDPs 
account for between 3.9 million people (estimates from the Colombian government) and 
5.2 million (Human Rights and Displacement Consultancy estimate). A disproportionate 
number of IDPs are either Afro-Colombians or indigenous people.13 Asylum requests in 
neighbouring Ecuador averaged almost 1,400 per month in the first six months of 2011. 14  
Confinement denotes the restriction of mobility and of access to goods and services in 
urban and rural areas resulting from restrictions imposed by armed groups and the 
widespread use of landmines. OCHA estimates that 30,000 people were affected by 
restrictions on goods, services and mobility in Colombia in 2010. 15 Another phenomenon 
linked to the armed conflict and gaining importance is the recruitment of children. While 
it is difficult to have a real estimate of the number of children involved,16 there is evidence 
that the average age of recruitment is decreasing from 13.8 years in 2001 to 12.8 in 2005, 
and 11.8 in 201017. 
 
The most pressing acute humanitarian needs stemming from the conflict and natural 
disasters in Colombia are:18 
 Protection : ensuring the physical security of the civilian populations affected by the 
conflict, as well as preparing for future displacements and raising awareness of weapon 
contamination19; 
                                                 
13  United Nations Information Centre, “A refugee in their own country : the fate of the Colombian IDPs”, 2012. 
http://www.unric.org/en/colombia/27002-a-refugee-in-their-own-country-the-fate-of-the-colombian-idps- 
14 (European Commission, Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Colombia, 2012. 
15 European Commission, Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Colombia, 2012. 
16  According to a 2005 estimate done by Human Rights Watch, more that 11.000 children are recruited as soldiers in 
Colombia. http://www.hrw.org/news/2005/02/21/colombia-armed-groups-send-children-war 
17  Constitutional Court of Colombia, Auto 251, 6 October 2008 quoting UNICEF- Defensoría del Pueblo Bulletin n°8 
“La niñez y sus derechos: la niñez en el conflicto armado colombiano”, 2002 and Bulletin n°9 “Caracterización de las 
niñas, los niños y los adolescentes desvinculados de los grupos armados ilegales: inserción social y productiva desde 
un enfoque de derechos humanos.”, 2006; International Crisis Group, “Mejorar la política de seguridad en 
Colombia”, Latin American Report n°23, June 2010. 
18 European Commission, Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Colombia, 2012. 
19 Protection was cited as the primary humanitarian need in Colombia by respondents to the DG ECHO survey of 
international humanitarian organisations conducted in August 2011. 
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 Emergency food and non-food assistance : the need to provide food, shelter and 
basic household items to newly-displaced populations; 
 Primary health care provision : coverage of the health system is incomplete, with 
rural and displaced populations suffering particularly poor access; 
 Access to safe water and sanitation: newly-displaced populations suffer poor access 
to drinkable water and sufficient sanitation20, whilst maintenance of sanitation systems 
in rural areas is also impeded by confinement. 
2.2.2  Assistance delivered by DG ECHO 
DG ECHO is a significant player in the international humanitarian response in 
Colombia and has been active in Colombia since 1994. Total DG ECHO assistance 
between 1994 and 2011 amounts to €160m21, with an average of 160,000 people assisted 
annually under the DG ECHO Global Plans for Colombia22. Annual contributions have 
been on an increasing trend between 1994 and 2012, starting from a contribution of €2.3m 
in 199423 to an indicative allocation of €12m under the Humanitarian Implementation Plan 
(HIP) for 2012. Over the evaluation period 2007-2012, the HIP budgets for Colombia have 
averaged €12m.24 These contributions make DG ECHO the biggest international donor of 
humanitarian aid over the evaluation period.25 
 
DG ECHO’s implementation plans over the 2007-2012 period reflect the four areas 
of acute humanitarian need outlined above, namely protection of civilian populations; 
emergency food and non-food aid; primary health care provision; and access to water, 
sanitation and hygiene.26 
 
In addition to these four sectoral areas of engagement, DG ECHO’s annual HIPs over 
the period 2010-2012 have consistently outlined the following priority criteria for 
engagement:27 
 Newly-displaced populations (i.e. those displaced within 12 months prior to aid 
delivery) 
 Inaccessible or hard-to-reach communities, including but not limited to confined 
populations 
                                                 
20  The III National Verification Survey in 2010 reported that 90% of the IDP population live below minimum dignity 
levels regarding sanitation provision. (III National Verification Survey conducted in 2010). 
21  European Commission, “EU Humanitarian aid in Colombia”, 2012, downloaded on 23/04/12 from 
http://ec.europa.eu/DG ECHO/aid/central_south_america/colombia_en.htm  
22  European Commission, Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Colombia, 2012. 
23  European Commission, “EU Humanitarian aid in Colombia”, 2012, downloaded on 23/04/12 from 
http://ec.europa.eu/DG ECHO/aid/central_south_america/colombia_en.htm  
24  Ibid.€13.34 including DIPECHO and response to natural disasters. 
25  UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Financial Tracking System, 2008-2012. 
26  European Commission, Humanitarian Implementation Plans (HIP) Colombia, 2007-2012 
27  European Commission, Humanitarian Implementation Plans (HIP) Colombia, 2010-2012. It should be noted that in 
2010 and 2007, DG ECHO supplemented these criteria with a specific response plan to the flooding experienced in 
Colombia in those years. Basic emergency assistance, specifically including food assistance, water and sanitation, 
temporary shelter, Emergency Relief Items, and Primary Health Care were prioritised. (DG 
ECHO/COL/BUD/2010/01000 : « Commission decision on the financing of emergency humanitarian actions in 
Colombia from the general budget of the European Union ») 
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 Colombian asylum seekers and refugees in neighbouring countries 
 Populations affected by natural disasters, notably the 2010 flooding in the most 
affected areas (Bolivar, Magdalena, Cordoba, Chocó, Sucre, Antioquia and Atlantico)28 
 Coordination with local and national bodies as a step towards exit or handover 
strategies, and avoiding substitution for government activities 
 Assistance to the most vulnerable demographic groups, namely women, children, 
elderly people as well as ethnic groups (indigenous and Afro-Colombian population) 
 
The inclusion of coordination with local and national bodies in recent HIPs is of particular 
importance in the perspective of Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development 
(LRRD).29  
 
                                                 
28  European Commission, Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Colombia, 2010. 
29 European Commission, Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Colombia, 2012. 
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3. Methodology 
This chapter presents the evaluation methodology, in particular (i) the evaluation approach; 
(ii) the tools and sources of information used; and (iii) the challenges and limitations of the 
exercise. 
 
The whole exercise can be illustrated by the pyramid below. The sources of information 
described in this chapter provide the factual basis for the analysis, the responses to the 
Evaluation Questions, and ultimately the drafting of the Conclusions and 
Recommendations. Each stage of the exercise corresponds to a section of this Draft Final 
Report as indicated in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 – Pyramid of the evaluation exercise 
 
3.1 Structured evaluation approach 
The structured sequence of the evaluation process was primarily based on the Joint 
Evaluation Unit’s methodological framework.30  The specific methodological tools used to 
collect data, such as the focus groups, are furthermore in line with the Joint Evaluation 
Unit’s evaluation tools31 (described in section 3.2). 
                                                 
30  European Commission, Evaluation Methods for the European Union’s External Assistance – Methodological Bases for Evaluation 
(volume 1), 2006, and updates on the Joint Evaluation Unit’s website.  
31  European Commission, Evaluation Methods for the European Union’s External Assistance – Evaluation Tools (volume 4), 2006. 
Recom.
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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES IN COLOMBIA ADE 
Final Report November 2012 Page 10 
3.1.1  The intervention logic 
The intervention logic, presented in Figure 3 overleaf, is a schematic representation of the 
European Union’s humanitarian activities in Colombia over the period January 2007 to 
June 2012. It has been reconstructed on the basis of several Commission communications 
and strategy documents on humanitarian aid, published prior to and during the evaluation 
period. Key documents used in this regard include:  
 The European Council Regulation 1257/96 concerning humanitarian aid, the 
Commission COM(2007) 317 “Towards a European Consensus on Humanitarian 
Aid”,  
 The European Commission’s Humanitarian Implementation Plans for Colombia 2007-
2012 and the COM (2001) 153 “Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development – An 
Assessment”, 
 The Evaluation of DG ECHO’s 2001 Intervention Plan in Colombia – Assessment of 
DG ECHO’s Future Strategy in Colombia (2002).  
The ALNAP guide “Evaluating humanitarian action using the OECD-DAC criteria 
(2006)” was also used to aid the structuring of the intervention logic.  
 
The intervention logic is presented in the form of an expected impact diagram. It 
differentiates five different levels: 
 Commission inputs (e.g. emergency aid);  
 Intended outputs (e.g. aid distribution systems); 
 Intended outcomes (e.g. most urgent needs of IDPs met); 
 Intermediate impacts on the target populations in Colombia (e.g. humanitarian 
situation for conflict-affected population improved);  
 Intended overall impacts on the humanitarian situation in Colombia, in line with the 
objectives of Commission humanitarian activities as stated in the European Consensus 
on Humanitarian Aid. 
 
In addition, the figure highlights the level at which the EQs are pitched within the 
intervention logic. 
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Figure 3 - Intervention Logic  
 
Humanitarian and 
security situation 
improved for people 
affected by  internal 
conflict  in Colombia
Council Regulation 
1257/96 Article 2 (b)
Inputs Outcomes Overall  Impacts
Lives saved and 
immediate relief 
provided for people 
facing severe crisis 
whether as a result of
natural disaster or of 
conflict
(European Consensus on 
Humanitarian Aid)
Intermediate Impacts
Humanitarian and 
security situation 
improved for people 
affected by  internal 
conflict  in 
neighbouring 
countries
Council Regulation 
1257/96 Article 2 (e)
Humanitarian 
situation improved 
for victims and 
potential victims of 
natural disasters  in 
Colombia
Council Regulation 
1257/96 Article 2 (a)
Most urgent needs of IDPs 
are met for 6 months after 
displacement
Most urgent humanitarian   
needs of confined 
communities  are met
IDP aid distribution systems 
including food and non‐food items
Confined community support 
systems,  including provision of 
water, food, health care, shelter, 
mine awareness‐raising.
Non‐emergency aid distribution to 
new IDPs including provision of non‐
emergency water and sanitation, 
shelter, food security, livelihood 
support, psycho‐social support
Protection systems  including 
safeguards, legal advice and child 
protection for all conflict‐affected 
populations
Improved protection of 
conflict‐affected 
populations,  including 
women and children
Council Regulation 1257/96 
Article 2 (g)
Monitoring and information 
exchange networks 
Efforts of humanitarian 
organisations active in 
Colombia are better 
coordinated
Protection systems  including  legal 
assistance and advice for refugees 
and asylum seekers
Emergency aid distribution systems 
for newly arrived conflict  victims  in 
neighbouring countries Protection for conflict 
victims in neighbouring 
countries is improved
Basic emergency needs of 
refugees and asylum 
seekers are covered
Emergency  distribution to victims 
of natural disasters
Mitigation and early warning 
systems
Urgent humanitarian needs 
of natural disaster victims 
are met and preparedness 
enhanced
Council Regulation 1257/96 
Article 2 (f)
EQ 6 
Improved living conditions 
and social integration of 
new IDPs
Outputs
Emergency aid for 
IDPs
Humanitarian 
assistance for confined 
communities
Non‐emergency aid 
for IDPs
Protection support for 
conflict‐affected 
persons
Support to monitoring 
and information 
exchange among 
humanitarian actors
Protection support for 
refugees and asylum 
seekers
Emergency aid for 
asylum seekers / 
refugees
Emergency aid for 
victims of natural 
disasters
Support for local 
disaster preparedness
EQ 7 
EQ 3 
EQ  2 EQ  5 EQ 4
EQ 1 
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES IN COLOMBIA ADE 
Final Report November 2012 Page 12 
3.1.2  The set of Evaluation Questions 
The Evaluation Questions (EQ), the related Judgment Criteria (JC) and their respective 
indicators (I), aim at addressing the key issues with respect to the European Union’s 
humanitarian activities in Colombia. They are derived from the intervention logic and the 
analysis of the main Commission policies and international policy documents relating to 
humanitarian assistance conducted during the Inception Phase. Table 1 lists the set of EQs 
which are further detailed thereafter. 
Table 1 - Overview of the Evaluation Questions 
 
 
The proposed set of seven EQs allows coverage of the main dimensions of the European 
Union’s intended strategy and actions in terms of humanitarian assistance to Colombia. 
They were developed with a view to limiting the scope of the evaluation so as to focus 
the analysis on the issues deemed to be most helpful to the Commission in 
developing its humanitarian assistance and programming. In this respect, EQ5 is a non-
traditional EQ in the sense that it is partly future-oriented and was added to help DG 
ECHO in its current reflection on intervention in urban settings. The EQs also cover the 
different evaluation criteria defined by the evaluation terms of reference. 
EQ 1 Relevance, Coverage
To what extent did DG ECHO’s humanitarian support in Colombia address the 
needs of the affected population in a timely manner?
EQ 2 Relevance
How have the needs of the affected populations evolved during the period covered by 
the present evaluation and how far are prior needs assessments valid in the light of the 
current situation?
EQ 3
Effectiveness, 
Impact
To what extend did the humanitarian activities in Colombia help people to meet their 
basic needs and regain a minimum of self-sufficiency?
EQ 4 
Effectiveness, 
Connectedness, 
Impact
To what extent were conditions conducive for an effective LRRD? What were the 
main challenges/achievements?
EQ 5 
Relevance, Added-
value
Is DG ECHO an appropriate donor to address humanitarian consequences emerging 
from urban violent context in Colombia? Considering DG ECHO’s mandate and 
timeframes, what would be DG ECHO’s added value?
EQ 6 
Coordination, 
Complementarity
and Coherence (3Cs)
To what extent were DG ECHO’s humanitarian activities complementary and 
coherent with actions of other humanitarian actors and stakeholders?
EQ 7 Efficiency
What were the major factors having an impact on the efficiency of the delivery of DG 
ECHO’s humanitarian assistance in the country?
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3.2 Tools and information sources 
Once the structuring phase was completed, information or facts were collected by the 
evaluation team through specific evaluation tools. This was carried out in the data 
collection stage which was divided into Desk and Field phases. 
Given the thematic scope of the evaluation, tools were chosen in order to ensure that the 
combination would yield the requisite facts at both strategic and interventions levels. 
Moreover, the tools used had to allow verification and cross-checking of the 
information collected. For example, the documentary analysis of the five study cases was 
completed and cross-checked with the field missions undertaken in each region where the 
interventions took place (see section 3.2.1 below on case studies). 
 
The toolbox used for this evaluation is schematically represented in the figure below. 
Further details for each tool are then provided. 
Figure 4 – Main information sources and tools 
 
 
 General-level Desk Study: the evaluators screened general-level strategy and 
operational documents relevant to EU’s humanitarian assistance. 
 Country-level Desk Study: the evaluators screened the EU’s strategy documents 
for Colombia and compiled the statistical data – number of interventions, number 
of beneficiaries, and budget - contained in the annual project tables (Cuadro Proyecto 
Plan Global).  
 Inventory of 2008-2012 interventions: the evaluators collated information from 
the annual project tables for Colombia over the evaluation period. 
 Case study documentary analysis: the evaluators conducted specific desk 
analysis of documents relating to the five case studies selected for the evaluation 
(see Table 2 below), including the Single Forms and Fichops. 
 Interviews in Brussels and Bogotá: semi-structured interviews were undertaken 
with key stakeholders including staff from DG ECHO, the EEAS, the EU 
Delegation, implementing partners, and representatives of the GoC (see Annex 5 
for a more comprehensive list of persons met). 
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 Workshop in Bogotá: this workshop, which lasted half a day and was attended by 
20 implementing partners, was organised with the double objective of informing 
implementing partners about the evaluation and collecting information from them. 
 Focus groups: based on the guidelines of the European Commission’s Joint 
Evaluation Unit, six focus groups were conducted in Bogotá and during the field 
visits. The evaluators used the focus groups to fill in information gaps and hence 
decided to conduct them with homogenous groups of stakeholders (as opposed to 
groups involving diverging points of view). 
 Case study field visits: the evaluation team conducted field visits to ten 
destinations in order to cover the five selected case studies (see map under 
Figure 4). Field visits lasted on average four days and involved interviews with 
implementing partners and project beneficiaries.  
 Information from on-going country evaluation: this information was collected 
through a phone interview with the team leader of the country evaluation and a 
sharing of the field mission’s debriefing presentation. 
3.2.1 The case studies  
As mentioned in the European Commission’s methods on evaluation tools, a case study is 
to provide a “picture which is often more reliable than the outputs from other tools in context of scarcity of 
basic data (which is often the case in country evaluations)”32  In the context of this evaluation, five 
case studies were selected for the purpose of collecting concrete information and also 
ensuring consistent focus for both the Desk and Field Phases.  
Figure 5 – Locations visited for the five case studies 
 
                                                 
32  European Commission, Evaluation Methods for the European Union’s External Assistance – Evaluation Tools (volume 4), 2006, 
p.80. 
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A balance had to be found when selecting these case studies, in order to meet a variety of 
criteria that can be summarized as follows: 
 
 Illustrating the « three families » with which DG ECHO works, i.e. the UN agencies, 
the Red Cross and NGOs; 
 Covering different regions; 
 Covering different sectors of intervention (protection, IDPs, food security, …) 
 Striking a balance between rural and urban interventions 
 
The table below describes the sector and implementing partner coverage of the selected 
case studies: 
Table 2 - Sector and implementing partner coverage  
of selected case studies 
Pre-selected by the 
team for case study 
Sector coverage Implementing 
organisation coverage 
Cordoba - FAO  Food security 
 Restoration of livelihoods 
 Productive assets of communities 
UN Agencies 
Various regions in 
Colombia - ICRC 
 IDPs 
 Coverage of basic needs and access 
to essential services 
 Restoring livelihoods 
 International humanitarian law 
(IHL). 
International Committee 
of the Red Cross 
Medellin - Save the 
Children UK 
 Forced recruitment 
 Urban violence 
 Community-based Protection 
Systems 
 Education 
NGO 
Costa Pacifica - 
Solidaridad 
Internacional 
 Protection 
 Indigenous, afro-descendants and 
vulnerable population 
NGO 
Ecuador - UNHCR  Persons in Need of International 
Protection (PINP) in Ecuador". 
 International Protection Regime 
 Humanitarian assistance and 
reception conditions 
UN Agencies 
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A brief snapshot of the five case study interventions, including for each intervention its 
description, objective, regional coverage, start date and duration, is presented below. It 
should be specified that these five case studies were analysed in detail during the desk 
phase. During the field phase the team did not limit itself to these interventions and visited 
operations that were both finalised and ongoing. This approach was all the more relevant 
insofar as in some cases project funding had been renewed.  
 
#1 FAO in Cordoba 
Project 
description 
"Emergency support to internally displaced persons and vulnerable people affected by 
violence in the southern region of the department of Cordoba" 
Specific 
objective 
Reduce the food insecurity and contribute to the restoration of 
livelihoods and productive assets of communities affected by violence in 
the southern region of Cordoba (Tierralta, La Apartada, Puerto 
Libertador and Montelibano). 
Regional 
coverage 
Department of Cordoba – Municipalities of Montelibano, La Apartada, 
Tierralta, and Puerto Libertador. 
Start date  15 August 2010 
Duration 9.5 months (originally planned for 8.5 months) 
Additional 
comments 
Monteria was visited as it hosts the FAO local Office and the 
department authorities. The team visited the two municipalities of 
Montelibano and Puerto Libertador. 
 
#2 ICRC in various regions in Colombia 
Project 
description 
"ICRC economic security and protection activities in Colombia" 
Specific 
objective 
IDPs are able to cover their basic needs and have access to essential 
services to help restore their livelihoods; all parties to the conflict have 
progressed in their acceptance of and respect for international 
humanitarian law (IHL). 
Regional 
coverage 
Assistance to internally displaced people is delivered in 11 cities of 
Colombia where the ICRC has offices. 
Start date  1 February 2010 
Duration 11 months 
Additional 
comments 
Cali was visited as it hosts a Sub-delegation Office of the ICRC. The 
team visited the two municipalities of Jambaló and Toribío. 
 
#3 Save the Children UK in Medellin 
Project 
description 
"Preventing forced recruitment of children by illegal armed actors: Saving Lives, 
Saving Children!" 
Specific 
objective 
Save the Children will work to improve the enrolment and permanence 
of children at school as the Save the Children experience (both globally 
and in Colombia) has shown that education is an effective method to 
prevent forced recruitment. Save the Children will work to create a 
protection network or community system that is adequately linked to 
the state protection system. 
Regional 
coverage 
City of Medellin; Comuna: 1 (Popular) and 8 (Villa Hermosa) 
Start date  1 August 2010 
Duration 12 months 
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#4 Solidaridad Internacional in the Costa Pacífica 
Project 
description 
"Protection and humanitarian assistance to indigeneous, afro-descendants and 
vulnerable population, affected by the armed conflict in the departments of Nariño 
and Valle del Cauca" 
Specific 
objective 
Access will have been facilitated to humanitarian assistance and 
institutional care for populations affected by conflict in the territories of 
ethnic communities in Valle del Cauca and Nariño. 
Regional 
coverage 
Valle del Cauca and Nariño.  
Start date  1 July 2010 
Duration 12 months 
Additional 
comments 
Tumaco was selected for its proximity to Ecuador. 
 
#5 UNHCR in Ecuador 
Project 
description 
"Protection and durable solutions for persons in Need of International Protection 
(PINP) in Ecuador" 
Specific 
objective 
To strengthen the international protection regime, provide humanitarian 
assistance and improve the reception conditions for persons in need of 
international protection (PNIP) in Ecuador. 
Regional 
coverage 
Ecuador: Provinces of Esmeraldas, Imbabura, Carchi, Pichincha, Santo 
Domingo, Sucumbios, Azuay, Orellana. The provinces are the recipients 
of the majority of Colombian refugees who look for a better life in the 
southern country. 
Start date  1 July 2010 
Duration 12 months 
Additional 
comments 
The team visited the UNHCR Office in Quito and travelled to the 
province of Sucumbios. 
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3.3 Challenges and limitations 
The evaluation faced a number of challenges relating to the specific evaluation tools, the 
security context in Colombia, and the delivery timeframe. The following text outlines in 
turn each of these challenges and the response of the evaluation team. 
 
First, the specific tools used for the evaluation presented their own challenges and 
limitations. As a rule the evaluation team sought to overcome any weaknesses of the 
evaluation tools by cross-checking information gathered from any one source against the 
findings from other evaluation sources, as described in Figure 4 above. Nevertheless 
specific challenges were posed by the use of case studies and focus group tools, both of 
which played an important role in the evaluation. The case studies provided the evaluation 
with a source of richly contextualised qualitative information on which to draw when 
seeking to understand the logic and rationale of engagements in Colombia. Nevertheless, 
information gathered from case studies cannot be generalised across all operations without 
careful consideration and cross-checking, and does not permit quantitative statistical 
interpretation. The evaluation team sought to overcome this limitation by using the case 
studies as illustrative contextualisers for information drawn from other sources rather than 
drawing generalised conclusions from the case studies as such. The focus groups were used 
to enlarge the reference sample by including different beneficiary groups, as well as to look 
for deeper explanations of and justification for strategic choices presented in the project 
documentation. However, the information gathered from focus groups remains qualitative 
in nature and subject to the opinions of the beneficiaries involved. The evaluation team 
sought to overcome this limitation by cross-checking information from focus groups 
against the documentary analysis and case study results during the evaluation synthesis 
phase. 
 
Second, the security situation in Colombia presented a particular challenge during the field 
phase of the evaluation, with the potential of making any one of the evaluation’s case 
studies too dangerous to complete. To prepare the team for the security risks and allow 
swift adaptation to any rapid change in security levels, the team underwent a specific 
security briefing at DG ECHO headquarters in Brussels prior to the launch of the field 
mission and then maintained close communication with DG ECHO throughout the field 
phase. In the event the team was able to conduct each of the case studies in full and 
without incident. 
 
Finally, the short timeframe of the evaluation presented the team with a specific challenge 
in respect of information gathering, field mission logistics and synthesis of the findings. 
The evaluation team sought to overcome this challenge by close cooperation with the 
reference group during the inception phase, ensuring that time constraints were anticipated 
clearly during the desk, field and synthesis phases of the evaluation. 
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4. Answers to the evaluation questions 
This chapter presents the answers to the seven Evaluation Questions. Three different levels 
have been used, providing three levels of presentation:  
 
 Answers to each Evaluation Question (EQ) in the form of summary boxes; 
 Findings and analysis on which each answer is based, as provided in the remainder 
of the text with indications of the Judgement Criteria (JCs) on which they are based.  
 Facts on which the findings are based, as provided in the Data Collection Grids for 
general-level and case study data collection. (in Annex 4). They consist of specific 
information on assessment at the level of the Indicators (I) under the EQs and JCs to 
which the different sections of this chapter refer. In addition, statistical information on 
projects (Annex 6) is directly provided in each EQ where relevant. 
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Evaluation Question 1 on ECHO's timely response to the needs 
of the affected population 
To what extent did the Commission’s humanitarian support in 
Colombia address the needs of the affected population in a timely 
manner?  
 
The Commission’s humanitarian strategy in Colombia is expressed by the Commission’s Humanitarian 
Implementation Plans (HIPs) in Colombia (2007-2012), as a focus on the following priority criteria for 
engagement: newly-displaced populations; inaccessible or hard to reach communities, including but not 
limited to confined populations; Colombian asylum seekers and refugees in neighbouring countries; 
populations affected by natural disasters, notably the 2010 flooding in the most affected areas (Bolivar, 
Magdalena, Cordoba, Chocó, Sucre, Antioquia and Atlantico)33; coordination with local and national 
bodies as a step towards exit or handover strategies and to avoid substitution for government activities; 
assistance to the most vulnerable demographic groups, namely women, children, elderly people as well as 
ethnic groups (indigenous and Afro-Colombian population). 
The question aims to evaluate ECHO’s overall approach in terms of responding to the needs of the affected 
populations. This encompasses different aspects:  
 Addressing the needs of the affected population in a timely manner. 
 Coverage of affected population, (in quantitative and qualitative terms), including an estimate of 
the affected population covered by each type of DG ECHO intervention, both in total and as a 
percentage of the total affected population. This will be done, on the basis of DG ECHO 
reporting documents and other relevant sources. 
 Extent to which the level of funding was sufficient to address needs. 
 
EQ 1 on ECHO's timely response  – Answer Summary Box 
In line with the humanitarian needs in the country, DG ECHO responded to a diverse 
range of needs and target groups, namely: emergency and non-emergency needs of 
internally displaced persons (IDPs); protection and humanitarian needs of confined 
populations; protection of conflict-affected populations and refugees and asylum seekers 
in neighbouring countries; and victims of natural disasters. The total levels of funding 
were broadly in line with programme targets and support was delivered in a timely 
manner. 
DG ECHO’s strategy targeted the most urgent needs of recently internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) in a timely manner and in accordance with SPHERE standards, with a targeted coverage 
of approximately 22% of the newly-displaced population. Evidence suggests that this emphasis 
was carried over to the operational level, with engagements successfully targeting these needs in a 
timely manner and working to mainstream SPHERE standards. In addition to emergency needs, 
DG ECHO also targeted improvements to the living conditions of IDPs with an average annual 
target coverage of 21% of the annual new IDP population. It should be noted that for the last two 
years of the evaluation period (2011 and 2012), DG ECHO has decided not to mention a specific 
target number of IDPs given the difficulties to have reliable figures on IDPs. 
 
                                                 
33 European Commission, Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Colombia, 2010. 
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The needs of confined communities were also targeted, most notably in rural areas. Specific 
obstacles to reaching confined communities were addressed in some cases. DG ECHO’s strategy 
and engagements also targeted the protection of conflict-affected persons throughout the 
evaluation period as well as the basic emergency needs of newly-arrived victims in Venezuela and 
in Ecuador. However, DG ECHO’s assistance to refugees provided via UNCHR was largely 
limited to officially recognized PNIPs following a Government of Ecuador change of procedure 
aimed at narrowing its criteria for registration. 
 
Finally, DG ECHO targeted both the urgent humanitarian needs arising from natural disasters via 
ad hoc budgeting decisions in response to particular emergencies, and also, to a limited extent, the 
consistent provision of support for disaster preparedness throughout the evaluation period. 
Significant funds were provided for humanitarian aid in Colombia which, the evidence suggests, 
were sufficient for the targeted objectives. DG ECHO’s engagements were usually implemented 
in a timely manner. 
The extent to which the most urgent needs of recent internally displaced 
persons for the first 6 months of displacement were targeted, in a timely 
manner and in accordance with SPHERE standards (JC 1.1) 
DG ECHO’s annual implementation plans included specific targeting of the 
emergency needs of newly internally displaced persons (IDPs), in line with 
SPHERE standards, and with a targeted coverage of approximately 22% of the 
newly-displaced population. 
 Each of DG ECHO’s Global Plans signed over the evaluation period included specific 
targeting of the emergency needs of newly-displaced populations for a period of six 
months following displacement34, in addition to the longer-term needs also addressed 
by the Plans.  
 The delineation of specific emergency needs was rather limited within the Global Plans, 
which provided an all-encompassing commitment to provide both food and non-food 
aid rather than a breakdown of support types. Nevertheless, specific reference was 
made to SPHERE standards and to the four core needs of WASH, food aid, shelter 
and emergency health provision.  
 The targeted coverage rose from 50,000 persons in 2007 and 2008 to 80,000 in 2009 
and 2010,35 amounting to an average coverage of 22% of the annual population of 
300,000 newly-displaced persons in Colombia. 36  
 
                                                 
34  With the exception of the Global Plan 2007, which targeted the provision of emergency aid for three months 
following displacement. 
35  Disaggregated data for the most urgent needs of new IDPs (within six months of displacement) are not given in 2011 
and 2012.  
36  The estimation of 300,000 displacements per year is presented in the COMMISSION DECISION on the approval and 
financing of a Global Plan for humanitarian actions from the budget of the European Communities for people affected by the conflict and 
natural disasters in Colombia (ECHO/-SM/BUD/2010/01000), 2010. 
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Evidence suggests that, over the evaluation period as a whole, DG ECHO 
engagements were successful in targeting these needs in a timely manner, whilst 
working to mainstream SPHERE standards.  
 Some case study operations demonstrated timeliness in their response to emergency 
needs. The support implemented via ICRC in the Municipio of Toribío in Northern 
Cauca, for example, quickly addressed emergency shelter needs arising from the 
conflict between the FARC, the military and the police. Within eight days of an 
incident involving the bombing of a police station by FARC, ICRC contributed to the 
reconstruction of partially-destroyed houses. 
 Some DG ECHO stakeholders interviewed by the evaluation team noted that 
SPHERE standards are known by implementing partners and are used as a reference 
point at operational level. Moreover, stakeholders noted that specific initiatives had 
been taken to mainstream SPHERE standards, including the conduct of workshops 
and production of materials which have been taken up and used by other donors.  
 
Final estimation of the coverage of newly-displaced persons is hampered by several 
factors, including constraints on estimating the total background population of 
IDPs. Indeed, the lack of a commonly-agreed definition of internally displaced persons, 
the presence of various unconsolidated IDP databases, and the under-registration of 
internally displaced persons, together precludes a consensus on the number of IDPs in the 
country. 
The extent to which living conditions of IDPs were targeted, including the 
meeting of at least one basic need, in accordance with SPHERE standards 
(JC 1.2) 
DG ECHO strategy targeted living conditions of IDPs throughout the evaluation 
period, in accordance with SPHERE standards, with an average annual target 
coverage of 21% of the annual newly-displaced population. 
 DG ECHO’s Global Plans and Humanitarian Implementation Plans for Colombia 
from 2007-2012 specifically targeted the meeting of at least one basic non-emergency 
need for the end-beneficiaries, as per SPHERE standards, in addition to the emergency 
needs outlined under JC1.1. above. 
 Delineation of core non-emergency IDP needs to be addressed by DG ECHO 
operations during each annual programming cycle was provided in the Global Plans 
and Humanitarian Implementation Plans over the evaluation period, as illustrated in 
the table below:37 
                                                 
37  Adapted from European Commission, Global Plan for Colombia, 2007-2010; European Commission, Humanitarian 
Implementation Plans for Colombia, 2011-2012 
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Table 3 - DG ECHO targeting of IDP non-emergency needs in Colombia 2007-
2012 
IDP non-emergency needs 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Water & Sanitation X X X X X X 
Improvement of shelter X X X X   
Access to health care X X X  X X 
Psychosocial support X X X X X X 
Food security  X X X X   
Restarting basic 
livelihoods 
X X X X   
Target coverage (# IDPs) 80,000 80,000 50,000 40,000 Not 
given  
Not 
given 
 
Average targeted coverage diminished significantly over the evaluation period, with 
DG ECHO’s emphasis moving to rural settings while a growing majority of IDPs 
and PNIPs moved to urban centres: 
 As illustrated in the table above, the target IDP coverage diminishes over the 
evaluation period. No explicit rationale for this reduction is provided in the Global 
Plans. However, over the period for which target coverage figures are provided, namely 
2007-2010, the average coverage is 62,500 IDPs on an annual basis. This amounts to 
21% of the annual 300,000 estimated population of newly-displaced persons in 
Colombia.38 
 DG ECHO’s priority remained provision of support in non-urban contexts over the 
evaluation period, while the majority of IDPs and PNIPs moved to urban centres. This 
gave rise to an increasingly large limit on the potential share of total IDPs being 
reached by DG ECHO operations aimed at improving IDP living conditions in 
Colombia. 
 
At operational level, the DG ECHO implementing organizations covered in the 
evaluation included references to SPHERE standards in the project logframes, as 
well as qualitative profiles of target groups.  
 The sectoral coverage of these logframe targets included many of the areas outlined in 
the DG ECHO Global Plans, including food assistance, short term food security and 
livelihood support, shelter, water and sanitation, and hygiene promotion. 
 Despite difficult conditions for assessing the situation of the population in confined 
communities, ECHO’s implementing partners were able to gather the basic data 
needed to draw up adequate qualitative beneficiary profiles (e.g. ICRC, Save the 
Children UK and Solidaridad Internacional).  
                                                 
38  The estimation of 300,000 displacements per year is presented in the COMMISSION DECISION on the approval and 
financing of a Global Plan for humanitarian actions from the budget of the European Communities for people affected by the conflict and 
natural disasters in Colombia (ECHO/-SM/BUD/2010/01000), 2010. 
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The most urgent humanitarian needs of confined communities were 
targeted by DG ECHO strategy and engagements (JC 1.3) 
At a strategic level, DG ECHO strategy and engagements targeted the needs of 
confined communities, most notably in rural areas: 
 DG ECHO Global Plans for Colombia over the evaluation period include explicit 
consideration of the needs of confined communities, including “the restrictions imposed by 
armed actors hamper access to food and productive activities (villagers cannot go to the fields to cultivate 
crops) and to basic goods and services such as health care. Thus, the local rural populations' livelihoods 
are endangered.”39 
 Over the period 2007-2009 DG ECHO’s Global Plans for Colombia included 
provision for confined communities, specifically covering the following needs: 
- water and sanitation assistance, including construction of water points 
- shelter improvement 
- health assistance, including mobile clinics to facilitate access to healthcare 
- psychosocial support 
- food security, including livelihood support, home gardens and canteens for 
returnees 
 From 2009-2012, DG ECHO’s strategy placed increased emphasis on support to 
conflict-affected rural communities, thereby reducing the strategic focus on confined 
communities in urban environments.40 
 
In addition, some DG ECHO operations contributed to making the phenomenon 
of confinement more visible and specifically targeted obstacles to the provision of 
assistance to confined communities: 
 Field evidence proved that, owing to the restricted access to areas controlled by armed 
groups, the conduct of solid needs assessments was challenging. Furthermore, there 
exists neither a set of rules on how to protect these populations nor comprehensive 
available official data.  
 Aware of this situation, ECHO funded in 2008/2009 an OCHA study on confined 
areas, covering 21 cases of restrictions on movement and access to basic goods and 
services over the period 2004-2009. The study identified women and children as the 
most affected groups within confined communities, owing to reductions in the quantity 
of food available, increases in intra-family violence, and the departure of male partners 
to seek other sources of income. 
 DG ECHO is not authorised to conduct negotiations with illegal armed groups, 
thereby limiting direct access to confined communities. However, by partnering with 
ICRC, which is the only organisation allowed by the GoC to negotiate with all parties, 
it has been able to overcome this problem.  
                                                 
39  European Commission, Global Plan for humanitarian actions from the budget of the European Communities for people affected by the 
conflict and natural disasters in Colombia (ECHO/-SM/BUD/2009/01000), 2009, p.7 
40   European Commission, Global Plan for humanitarian actions from the budget of the European Communities for people affected by 
the conflict and natural disasters in Colombia), 2009-2010 ; European Commission, Humanitarian Implementation Plans for 
Colombia, 2011-2012 
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The extent to which DG ECHO targeted protection of conflict-affected 
persons and the basic emergency needs of newly-arrived refugees in 
neighbouring countries (JCs 1.4 & 1.5) 
DG ECHO strategy and engagements specifically targeted protection of conflict-
affected persons throughout the evaluation period: 
 DG ECHO Global Plans and Humanitarian Implementation Plans throughout the 
evaluation period specifically targeted improvements in the protection of the conflict-
affected populations, in line with current international agreements (including direct 
reference to International Humanitarian Law and the International Convention on 
Child Rights) and the Colombian legal framework (including specifically Law 387, 
sentence T025) 
 Field evidence suggests that DG ECHO engagements also provided specific attention 
to protection and humanitarian assistance for indigenous, afro-descendants and 
vulnerable populations affected by the armed conflict (e.g. projects in the departments 
of Nariño and Valle del Cauca).  
 
The basic emergency needs of newly-arrived victims in Venezuela and Ecuador 
were targeted by DG ECHO in the strategy documents and through implementing 
agencies' interventions:  
 DG ECHO’s strategy documents from 2007-2012 targeted protection and provision of 
basic emergency needs for newly-arrived victims in neighbouring countries, particularly 
Ecuador, Venezuela and Panama.  
 Coverage targets were equal to the annual UNHCR estimates of new asylum requests 
from Colombians in neighbouring countries over the evaluation period (approximately 
29,000 per year in 2010), yielding the targeted 100% coverage of official refugees and 
asylum seekers.41  
At operational level UNHCR is the primary mandated agency that provides assistance 
to Colombian refugees and asylum seekers in neighbouring countries. In 2011, with 
DG ECHO support, UNHCR offered protection to 52,461 refugees and asylum 
seekers, that is accomplishment of 96% of the target figure.42 
 
However, even though DG ECHO has stressed the need to maintain assistance to 
all PNIPs, its assistance to refugees provided via UNCHR was largely limited to 
officially recognized PNIPs, following a Government of Ecuador change of 
procedure aiming at narrowing its criteria for registration43:  
 During 2011 DG ECHO intervened to request UNHCR to revise its modus operandi 
following a monitoring visit which revealed gaps in coverage.  
 UNHCR estimates that some 30% of new arrivals in 2011 were in need of international 
protection but were not being attended to properly.44 Nevertheless, as noted by 
stakeholders interviewed in the field, UNHCR did address non-registered PNIPs 
                                                 
41  European Commission, Humanitarian Implementation Plans for Colombia, 2012 
42  00830 UNHCR Fichop 2011, p29 
43  00830 UNHCR  fichop 2011 p16 
44  00830 UNHCR fichop 2011, p29. 
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through community programmes and specific protection interventions for vulnerable 
cases.45  
The extent to which urgent humanitarian needs arising from natural 
disasters were targeted by DG ECHO strategy and engagements (JC 1.6) 
DG ECHO targeted both the urgent humanitarian needs arising from natural 
disasters via ad hoc budgeting decisions in response to particular emergencies, and 
also, to a limited extent, consistent provision of support for disaster preparedness 
throughout the evaluation period. Specifically:  
 Disaster preparedness was a target of DG ECHO strategy in Colombia throughout the 
evaluation period, including strengthening of local preparedness and small-scale 
mitigation activities. However the major focus remained on the victims of the conflict, 
with only 10% of DG ECHO’s aid targeting disaster preparedness.46 
 In addition, an ad hoc contribution of €2.6m was made in 201, in response to the winter 
of 2010-2011 when flooding, which affected almost 2 million persons (ECHO 2010 
handout “Nuestra Acciones en 2010”). Through the Save the Children project in 
Medellin, emergency plans were developed to address both complex emergencies and 
disasters47. 
The extent to which DG ECHO protection, emergency and non-emergency 
humanitarian support allocated sufficient funding to meet the targeted 
objectives in a timely manner (JC 1.7) 
DG ECHO provided significant funds for humanitarian aid in Colombia, which the 
evidence suggests were sufficient for the targeted objectives: 
 DG ECHO is the most significant donor of humanitarian aid in Colombia (the largest 
in 2012, according to Financial Tracking Service, with 13,748,629 US dollars). 
 None of the projects considered in this evaluation demonstrated a major need for 
upward budget revision to meet their original objectives. 
 In the case of the flooding during the winter of 2010, DG ECHO showed a high level 
of flexibility in providing extra funding to assist victims in response to this unexpected 
event. 
 
DG ECHO’s engagements were usually implemented in a timely manner: 
 DG ECHO programmes are usually implemented within one year 
 The inventory of programmes from 2009 to 2012 (Cuadro Proyectos Plan Global ) shows 
that none of the programmes lasted over a year. 
                                                 
45  As noted in field interview, MN 224. 
46  Idem. 
47  01017 SCUK sf 2010 p 11 
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Evaluation Question 2 on the evolvement of the needs of the 
affected population 
How have the needs of the affected populations evolved during the 
period covered by the present evaluation and how far are prior needs 
assessments valid in the light of the current situation? 
 
The political context has changed significantly in Colombia over the evaluation period. Since President 
Santos took power in 2010, diplomatic ties with neighbouring countries Ecuador and Venezuela have been 
restored, and the “Victims Law” passed in 2011 is attempting to restore land and provide compensation 
for those affected by the conflict.48 Moreover, the emergence of new conflict actors, the “Bandas Criminales”, 
beyond the main guerrilla groups and the Colombian government, has changed the conflict dynamics since 
the mid-2000s. The impact of these changes, and others, on the humanitarian needs of the population must 
therefore be taken into account when evaluating DG ECHO’s engagements over the evaluation period. 
The question seeks to assess the evolution of the needs of the affected populations over the evaluation period, 
as well as evaluating the monitoring of such trends by DG ECHO and the use of needs analyses to target 
DG ECHO’s involvement. It covers all aspects of the Commission’s engagements, viz.: 
 the extent to which DG ECHO based its intervention strategy on an analysis of the needs of conflict- 
and natural-disaster-affected populations in Colombia;  
 the extent to which the needs of those populations have evolved over the evaluation period; 
 the extent to which DG ECHO monitored these developments over the evaluation period.  
 
EQ 2 on evolvement of needs  – Answer Summary Box 
With the changes in the conflict dynamics, the populations affected by the conflict 
increased but their persistent needs have generally remained the same. DG ECHO and 
implementing partners devoted attention to assessing the needs as well as following up 
their evolution. Needs assessments generally provided valuable information for tracking 
the trends in needs, while monitoring exercises led to adaptation of activities to better 
respond to the evolving needs. 
DG ECHO built its intervention strategy on an analysis and identification of the needs of the 
conflict-affected population. This assessment of the needs was done through an analysis of 
information received from national authorities, Colombian NGOs and universities. 
Furthermore, DG ECHO organised written annual consultations with the UN, the Red Cross 
and active NGOs. It did not conduct its own comprehensive needs assessments but the 
evidence suggests that this has not prevented DG ECHO from addressing the specific needs of 
the conflict-affected and natural-disaster-affected populations.  
The conflict dynamics changed over the period: development of BACRIMs, increased urban 
violence, use of communities as a tactical and economic resource, a greater number of natural 
disasters, and so on. These trends resulted in an increase in the population affected by the 
conflict and natural disasters, but globally the nature of the needs of the affected populations 
remained the same. The evaluation period also witnessed important institutional and regulatory 
changes from 2011 onwards and, despite a high level of humanitarian assistance, humanitarian 
                                                 
48 European Commission, “Humanitarian Implementation Plan for Colombia”, 2012. 
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needs remained persistent.  
DG ECHO monitored the trends in needs at strategy level through regular exchanges with the 
humanitarian actors in the field. At operational level DG ECHO conducted monitoring 
missions to track the trends and its project reporting system has allowed useful documentation 
of activities implemented. Moreover, implementing partners closely followed up implementation 
of activities in the field. Where appropriate, operations have been revised in response to 
monitoring results so as to better correspond to evolving needs. Finally, previous needs 
assessments carried out by implementing partners constituted valuable sources of information 
for tracking the various shifts in regional conflict and disaster hot-spots and the emergence of 
new conflict actors.  
On the extent to which DG ECHO based its strategy on recent needs 
assessments of the conflict- and natural-disaster-affected populations of 
Colombia and on the content of these needs assessment (JC 2.1 & JC 2.5)   
DG ECHO has based its intervention strategy on the humanitarian needs identified 
through formal annual consultations with major humanitarian actors. Its needs 
assessment was also based on information received from other sources such as 
national authorities, Colombian NGOs and universities. Its strategy has however 
not been based on its own comprehensive and detailed needs assessments. 
 Every year DG ECHO organises a formal consultation process with the United 
Nations, the Red Cross and active NGOs during which the actors each present their 
views on the sectors, populations and geographical zones to be targeted. It uses the 
information gathered in that forum to build up the intervention strategy presented in its 
successive Humanitarian Intervention Plans (HIPs). 
 DG ECHO also uses the contextual information from the questionnaires it addresses 
to its implementing partners, as well as from the government, in preparing its HIPs. 
 DG ECHO also analysed information provided by Colombian universities and NGOs 
specialised in conflict and displacement 
 DG ECHO has not carried out independent needs assessment exercises to inform the 
design of its strategy. In HIPs a specific section is devoted to identification and 
assessment of humanitarian needs. That section briefly presents the main affected 
groups and humanitarian needs to be addressed but does not constitute a thorough and 
detailed needs assessment. Nevertheless, as suggested below, this has not prevented 
DG ECHO from addressing the specific needs of the conflict-affected and natural-
disaster-affected populations. 
 
At intervention level DG ECHO has emphasized the importance of conducting 
quality needs assessments prior to formulation. DG ECHO-funded interventions 
have been based on recurrent needs assessments carried out by the implementing 
partners. 
 With the “Single Form for Humanitarian Aid Actions”, DG ECHO has established a 
general format which emphasizes the methodological and factual presentation of the 
intervention-related needs assessments. The detailed situation of the beneficiaries has 
been included in the funding requests for actions to be implemented, while the 
description of the change in the conflict environment has been linked to the needs of 
the affected population.  
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 As from 2010, the quality of the needs assessments prepared by the implementing 
partners has been defined as a standard benchmark for assessment of the proposals. 
 For all case-study interventions, needs assessments of the conflict- and natural-disaster-
affected populations have been carried out by the implementing partners. They 
consisted of both quantitative and qualitative analyses and were generally detailed, 
except in one case study (Save the Children). 
 
DG ECHO strategy documents and needs assessments at operational level took 
into account the specific needs of the conflict-affected and natural-disaster-affected 
populations.  
 The successive Global Plans briefly present the needs of the population by affected 
population group:  displaced population, conflict-affected rural population, women, 
children, ethnic groups (Afro-Colombians and indigenous), victims of the Columbian 
conflict in neighbouring countries, and host communities. 
 For case-study interventions, the needs assessments generally define the needs of 
particular groups within the affected population (e.g. women and children). Case-study 
interventions have generally been designed with a view to addressing the specific needs 
of vulnerable groups. In one case study specific indicators on the vulnerable 
population were developed. 
On the evolution of the needs of conflict-affected and natural-disaster-
affected populations of Colombia (JC 2.2) 
With the evolution of the conflict dynamics the population affected by conflict 
increased over the period covered; but globally the nature of the needs of conflict-
affected and natural-disaster-affected populations remained the same. 
 New regional and local conflict hotspots and new conflict types appeared during the 
evaluation period. Despite the fact that there is no consolidated database on IDPs and 
despite the bias created by the fact that victims of BACRIMs are not considered as 
victims and are therefore not registered as IDPs, the data collected during this 
evaluation point to an increase of the overall population affected by conflict. Key 
conflict trends over the period are highlighted below: 
- the development of BACRIMs has created an increase in the number of persons 
affected by violent acts; 
- the rise in urban violence has created a new type of conflict dynamic which 
increases the vulnerability of urban populations and of specific vulnerable groups 
in the urban environment; 
- intensified mining activities and mega-projects which increase the pressure on 
land tenure and the vulnerability of the local population have generated higher 
levels of conflict-proneness; 
- climate change resulted in a higher number of natural disasters and hence 
increased the number of affected communities and populations; 
- operating groups increasingly used communities as a tactical and economic 
resource, for example exploitation of the population as a resource, use of 
communities as shields, and continued elimination of community leaders; 
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- protection needs for children in urban settings increased, and forced recruitment 
of children by armed groups continued 49;  
- the traditional conflict involving the FARC has moved further South and the 
debilitated guerrillas have relied increasingly on hit-and-run raids. 
 But these trends did not give rise to changes in the nature of the needs of the affected 
populations. The interviews conducted during the field mission, as well as the case-
study interventions, show that there have been no fundamental changes in 
humanitarian needs following the changes in the conflict dynamics. For instance the 
needs of disaster-affected populations have been maintained since Colombia is located 
in a disaster-prone region. The absence of fundamental changes in the needs of the 
persons affected is also acknowledged by the HIP 2012 which indicates that the 
growing number of BACRIM causes an increase in protection needs whereas 
humanitarian needs remain the same. 
 
Despite a high level of humanitarian assistance and important institutional and 
regulatory changes that have taken place since 2011, humanitarian needs remained 
persistent over the period.  
 The 2007-2012 HIPs indicate a high level of humanitarian assistance but with 
structural gaps relating to confined communities and non-registered IDPs.  
 Since the election of President Santos significant changes have taken place in the 
political domain and in the attention given to victims. In particular the Colombian 
government has recognised the existence of the internal conflict and in June 2011 
passed the new Victims Law to compensate victims of the internal conflict and to 
return land to millions of displaced people. 
 But the recent institutional and legal reforms have contributed to creating a backlog in 
the registration of IDPs and delayed attention to their needs. Indeed, the new Victims 
Law has put an administrative burden on the local authorities (UAOs) responsible for 
the registration of IDPs and for providing initial assistance during the 90 days 
following displacement. By the end of the evaluation period these UAOs had not yet 
developed sufficient capacities to cope with the flow of IDPs.  
                                                 
49   Despite the fact that there is no reliable consolidated data on the increase in such practice, the average age of 
recruited children is decreasing according to certain sources (average of 13,8 yrs old in 2001 to average of 11,8 yrs old 
in 2011). 
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On the monitoring of the evolution of needs of conflict-affected and 
natural-disaster-affected populations of Colombia and on the validity of 
prior needs assessments in the light of the current situation in Colombia 
(JC 2.3 & JC 2.4) 
DG ECHO monitored the evolution of needs at strategy level through regular 
exchanges with the humanitarian actors in the field.  
 During the annual consultations ECHO retrieved information on local trends from its 
implementing partners. The field mission has shown that this type of exercise has 
allowed DG ECHO to monitor the trends in needs. 
 Additionally, DG ECHO has maintained regular contact with the United Nations, the 
Red Cross and active NGOs, enabling it to track the evolution of humanitarian needs. 
 
The evolution of needs has been monitored at operational level through visits and 
adequate reporting by DG ECHO and through the monitoring efforts of 
implementing partners. Where appropriate operations have been revised in 
response to monitoring results so as to better respond to evolving needs.  
 DG ECHO’s system of project reporting allowed useful documentation of 
implemented activities. It consists of two documents: (i) the Fichops – DG ECHO’s 
operational tool for following up humanitarian aid projects, filled in by DG ECHO 
staff in HQ and in the field; and (ii) the Single Forms filled in by the implementing 
partners. The Fichops give an overview of the project from its approval up to the final 
report, and record the essentials of project performance.   
 DG ECHO conducted field visits to monitor the implementation of its funded 
activities in all five case studies.  
 Implementing partners have also established individual monitoring systems to follow 
up implementation of the projects. Sometimes they conducted joint exercises to assess 
the context and analyse the effects of interventions at wider regional level (e.g. joint 
monitoring mission with OCHA and ACNUR for the SI 2009 action).  
 Overall these monitoring efforts strengthened the relevance of the operations through 
the regular updated information and analysis they provided. Indeed in the wake of 
monitoring exercises case study interventions have sometimes been revised to better fit 
evolving needs. For instance the FAO revised its intervention in order to adapt it to the 
new needs of the targeted population which was also confronted with floods (Córdoba 
-FAO case study).  
 Implementing partners also sometimes adapted their internal structure to take into 
consideration the evolution of the conflict zones. The ICRC revised its structure in the 
country so as to ensure greater presence in zones heavily affected by the conflict while 
reducing its presence in others. 
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Previous needs assessments carried out by implementing partners constituted 
valuable sources of information for tracking the various shifts in regional conflict 
and disaster hot-spots and the emergence of new conflict actors as well as new 
conflict types.  
By way of a brief review of each major implementing partner reviewed during this 
evaluation: 
 ICRC, which follows a multi-sectoral approach, conducted needs assessments at multi-
sectoral level, some interviewees stressing the importance of a multi-sectoral approach 
given the diversity of the needs; 
 SI conducted regular assessments of the situation in the region through its local offices, 
but coordination and coverage of assessment of other humanitarian actors have 
nonetheless been limited; SI also has a database of families affected by the conflict 
useful for identifying needs and it undertook periodic monitoring which provided data 
on population coverage; 
 UNHCR gathered independent information from the regular monitoring visits it 
conducted, also compiling profiling and statistics on the refugee population in Ecuador; 
 OCHA generates a Humanitarian Bulletin which contains assessment components and 
constitutes an independent source of information; civil society actors such as 
indigenous community organisations have used it as a valid source of information on 
humanitarian needs.  
 
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES IN COLOMBIA ADE 
Final Report November 2012 Page 33 
Evaluation Question 3 on meeting basic needs and helping 
regain self-sufficiency 
To what extent did the humanitarian activities in Colombia help people  
 meet their basic needs and regain a minimum of self-sufficiency? 
 
The Commission's humanitarian interventions in Colombia over the period 2007-2012 have included 
provision of both emergency and non-emergency humanitarian aid. In the latter case the Commission 
humanitarian implementation plans 2007-2012 specifically refer to the objective of meeting target 
populations’ basic needs, in line with SPHERE standards, and helping displaced and confined persons 
achieve minimum levels of self-sufficiency. This is of particular importance in the context of the high 
accumulated IDP figures in Colombia (estimated at 3.7 million by the government)50. With 150,000 
refugees and asylum seekers in neighbouring cities,51 mostly in Ecuador and Venezuela, the humanitarian 
crisis has spread to the border zone, and persons in need of international protection (PNIPs)52 have 
constituted the other main target population of DG ECHO’s assistance. 
 
This question focuses specifically on the extent to which DG ECHO’s actions have contributed to helping 
people affected by the conflict - IDPs, members of confined communities and PNIPs - to meet their basic 
needs and regain a minimum of self-sufficiency.  
 
EQ 3 on meeting basic needs and helping regain self-sufficiency  – Answer Summary Box 
The lack of quantitative figures limits an assessment of the effectiveness of DG 
ECHO’s interventions. Nevertheless, the results achieved in the interventions 
visited suggest that DG ECHO has been effective in addressing the basic needs 
of its target populations. However there were some limitations with respect to an 
improvement in the living conditions of IDPs in large city centres as well as the 
self-sufficiency of confined communities’ members. The living conditions of 
refugees and asylum seekers were improved even though this outcome largely 
depended on the Ecuadorian legislation on asylum. 
There are no clear quantitative figures on the effective coverage of DG ECHO’s 
interventions. But it is clear that some specific categories of IDP were not reached, as 
was the case with unregistered IDPs displaced to big cities for over 90 days.  
The results achieved in the interventions visited during this mission suggest that DG 
ECHO’s support has contributed to meeting the basic needs of the IDPs reached by its 
interventions. 
With respect to confined communities, DG ECHO’s implementing partners were able 
to access the areas of confinement despite the difficult security conditions, and to 
address the basic needs of the populations. Taking into consideration the proximity of 
drug production and trafficking, often at the origins of confinement, the goal of 
ensuring livelihoods in these communities has been key to preventing its members, 
                                                 
50  The total number of IDPs since 1997 is 3.7 million according to Acción Social, and 5.2 million since 1985 according 
to CODHES. 
51  This is only the figure of Colombians officially recognized as refugees and asylum seekers. According to the UNHCR, 
there are between 150,000 and 250,000 Colombians that are in a refugee-like situation. 
52  PNIPs include refugees, asylum seekers and people in refugee like situation such as those which did not apply for 
refugee status or were rejected for different reasons 
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especially the youth, from becoming involved in illegal activities. The success of 
productive projects has depended considerably on the entrepreneurial capacities of the 
different beneficiaries.  The fact that no thorough market studies were conducted 
limited the positive effects of some projects. 
Finally, the UNHCR, DG ECHO’s implementing partner for addressing the needs of 
PNIPs, has based its assistance on strengthening of the receiving communities. This 
approach has had the double positive effect of improving the living conditions of the 
refugees and asylum seekers and of enhancing social cohesion, while mitigating the 
occurrence of violent xenophobic acts. Nevertheless the effectiveness of DG ECHO’s 
support for refugees and asylum seekers has been strongly influenced by the national 
legislation of the GoE, positively between 2008 and 2010 but negatively thereafter. 
The extent to which the living conditions of internally displaced persons 
targeted by DG ECHO’s support were improved, including the meeting of 
basic needs as defined by SPHERE standards (JC 3.1) 
Information on how effectively the targeted populations have had their living 
conditions improved is lacking.   
From 2008 to the present day (data submitted by DG ECHO in August 2012), DG 
ECHO has implemented a total of 129 interventions costing € 57,999,175..53 . According 
to DG ECHO’s office in Colombia, these interventions have benefitted approximately 
800,000 people (all types of beneficiaries included).This is set against the background of 
a total IDP population of between 3.75 million54 and 5.2 million55; a refugee figure of 
approximately 395,60056; and approximately 2.8 million natural disaster victims in 2010.57  
 
The lack of reliability of these figures precludes using them to provide exact figures on 
the number of beneficiaries covered by DG ECHO’s interventions. The main sources of 
discrepancy are the following:   
 at macro level:  
- the government does not recognize victims of BACRIMs (they do not therefore 
appear in official statistics) whereas other humanitarian actors such as the ICRC 
do include these victims;  
 at meso level:  
- there are different databases – from the DPS, from the Public Ministry and 
from the Planes Integrales Únicos at municipal level - and these have not been 
consolidated;  
- there is also transition at national level from the SIPOD system still in use at 
the end of the evaluation period to the future RUV system (Registro Unico de 
Victimas); 
- the difficulty of having available the exact number of beneficiaries when 
intervening through multi-donor projects or through UN agencies; 
 at micro level: 
                                                 
53  DG ECHO’s inventory (Cuadro Proyectos Plan Global 2008-2012) 
54  According to Acción Social 
55  According to CODHES 
56  According to the UNHCR 
57  Dirección de Gestión del Riesgo. This number is exceptionally high as that year the floods were the most severe 
recorded in the last three decades. 
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- there are persons who suffer from repeated displacements when living in a zone 
that is permanently in conflict but who are not yet willing to abandon their 
lands; these are not registered despite the specific needs resulting from their 
repeated displacement; 
- when major displacement occurs, counting direct beneficiaries is also difficult; 
- there are victims who are moving to larger departmental capitals (instead of a 
smaller city closer to their former home) precisely in order to remain 
anonymous  -  and these will not register; 
- there are victims who will not register simply because they do not know how to; 
even though no statistics exist on this group it seems that their number is 
decreasing, as people seem to have become better informed in recent years. 
Some specific categories of IDP were not covered by DG ECHO’s interventions. 
That was the case with unregistered IDPs having displaced to large cities such as 
Bogotá or Medellin for over 90 days).  Those who do not register out of fear will tend to 
move further away from their home to bigger urban centres precisely to preserve their 
anonymity. It is therefore difficult to assess whether these IDPs have managed to improve 
their living conditions after ceasing to be eligible for emergency support, especially 
considering that these displaced populations have an agricultural background and are ill-
prepared for their new urban environment.   
 
In major cities DG ECHO’s assistance was focused only on addressing the basic needs of 
the recently displaced. This approach was based on the idea that other IDPs would be 
assisted by the Colombian State institutions. But, as mentioned above, one challenge in 
addressing the needs of IDPs is their under-registration in the official system. The GoC 
admits that approximately 23% of IDPs do not register, either out of fear or just because 
they do not know how to claim assistance. DG ECHO has been aware of this problem of 
registration and has addressed the needs of unregistered IDPs but, in large city centres, this 
assistance was limited to 90 days. 
 
The case studies selected showed that DG ECHO’s support has contributed to 
meeting the basic needs of IDPs: 
 
 ICRC in protection, food and NFIs: the ICRC intervened in all sectors but gave 
added value in the sector of protection by being the only organisation allowed to 
negotiate with all parties to the conflict. This type of dialogue has proved paramount 
when searching for missing persons or helping IDPs re-establish family links. It is 
difficult to make a quantitative assessment of protection projects as most data such as 
the number of beneficiaries are confidential. Nevertheless the evaluation team was able 
to witness the precautions taken by both ICRC international delegates and local staff in 
attendance on IDPs so as to preserve confidentiality. With respect to assistance in food 
and NFIs, it has been twofold: (i) facilitating IDPs' access to State assistance, 
redirecting them to UAOs, and (ii) directly addressing the needs of IDPs, notably by 
distributing food and non-food vouchers. Instead of distributing food rations, 
vouchers that can be used in local shops were given. This contributed to preserving the 
dignity of the person assisted and also his or her food habits. Other items were 
distributed with the vouchers such as cutlery, blankets, mattresses or hammocks (again 
to respect the cultural habits of those assisted). According to ICRC statistics, from 
January to June 2012 the ICRC in Cali assisted 2,800 persons, which is significant when 
considering that the UAO backlog in Cali for the first six months of 2012 was 1,500 
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IDPs waiting to be registered.58 Furthermore, indicators were introduced in the log-
frame of the project with a view to monitoring whether the distributed items were of 
sufficient quantity and of good-to-excellent quality. 
 Save the Children in protection: the project targeted urban children at risk of forced 
recruitment in two communes of Medellin. Medellin is the city that receives the greatest 
number of IDPs each year after Bogotá. The two communes targeted by the project 
were those with the highest displacement rates. According to official sources 73% of 
the total IDP population are women and children.59  The project has met the 
protection needs of the children by creating a safe environment in which children could 
learn and play. The evaluation team was able to visit two of the communities, Comuna 
8 Alticos and Vila Turbay. The projects addressed the needs of children both in and 
out of school and kept them away from dangerous activities by developing flexible 
learning methodologies for those who had dropped out of the formal system. It also 
included advocacy work for parents and teachers on the security risks faced by children 
and information on where and to whom to go if they had concerns about their 
protection. According to monitoring reports the project targeted a total of 2,240 
beneficiaries including children, parents, teachers and public officials. 
 Solidaridad Internacional in WASH: Solidaridad Internacional also intervened in all 
sectors. The project selected had a WASH component which consisted of improving 
access to safe water in sufficient quantities, and improved access to sanitation. The 
increased comfort of the families targeted as well as an improvement in their hygiene 
was witnessed during the field visit to Tumaco. A total of 60 families were affected by 
this WASH component.  
The extent to which the living conditions of persons within confined 
communities targeted by DG ECHO’s action have improved, including the 
attainment of a minimal level of self-sufficiency where relevant (JC 3.2) 
Assisting confined communities has been another focus of DG ECHO’s 
humanitarian assistance, mainly in a rural context. DG ECHO’s assistance has sought 
over the evaluation period to improve access by these communities to basic goods and 
services and, when possible, restore their livelihoods. It has concentrated its actions in rural 
areas where the Colombian State is absent or only present through its security apparatus 
engaged in the conflict. 
 
Although the phenomenon is much less visible than that of IDPs and more difficult 
to measure, there is evidence that DG ECHO’s support has contributed to 
improving the living conditions of the confined communities targeted. In some 
cases a level of self-sufficiency was achieved when building on existing capacities. 
As emphasized in monitoring reports, DG ECHO’s implementing partners were able to 
have access to these communities despite the difficult security conditions. The case studies 
selected and other projects visited showed that their support has contributed to improving 
their living conditions, viz.:  
 FAO in food security: the project selected was to benefit approximately 3,250 people. 
According to monitoring reports 88 per cent of families involved in the project 
activities could obtain food from their plots for their own consumption.  The sites 
                                                 
58  As explained in Chapter 2, this backlog was created by the institutional and legal changes introduced in 2011 and 
2012.  
59  Important to recall in this respect that 28.8% of the Colombian population is aged between 0 and 14 years old. 
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visited by the evaluation team in Montelibano and Puerto Libertador showed 
improvements in nutrition and food diversification. 
 ICRC in health and protection: the ICRC has developed in Northern Cauca a 
partnership with the Colombian Red Cross and an indigenous health service 
organization with the aim of setting up mobile health care units (known as health 
brigades) in the different communities where medical professionals no longer wished to 
practice because of lack of security. With respect to protection, the ICRC along with 
other implementing partners such as Diakonie have been encouraging the 
establishment of meeting-places, Sitios de Asamblea Permanente (SAP), as an auto-
protection and preparedness measure. The communities would identify for themselves 
a place such as a school or a community hall where they could store all the non-food 
items that the community members would need in the event of displacement. This has 
prevented them from becoming permanently displaced and has allowed them to keep 
control over their land which is often their source of livelihood. Furthermore it has 
prevented them from walking great distances, reducing exposure to mine risks. The 
evaluation team could visit two of these SAPs in the municipalities of Jambaló and 
Toribío. These places were clearly indicated and implementing partners have conducted 
advocacy work so that they are not occupied or exploited by the warring parties. 
 Solidaridad Internacional in livelihoods: livelihood projects were paramount in 
confined communities as they constituted an alternative to illegal activities. Indeed, one 
of the reasons for confinement is the armed groups’ need to protect their drug 
production site and their trafficking routes. Member of confined communities, 
especially young people, often find themselves enrolled in these illegal lucrative 
activities undertaken near their home, for want of any alternative.  Some beneficiaries 
of aid for productive projects have stated that their earnings had allowed them to cover 
several needs, for example food, housing or health. However, the success of livelihood 
projects depended highly on the entrepreneurial capacities of the different beneficiaries. 
Furthermore, the fact that no thorough market studies were conducted limited the 
positive effects of some projects.  
 Save the Children in protection: the interventions implemented by Save the Children 
have contributed to demonstrating that confinement (invisible barriers) also occurs in 
urban contexts. The creation of safe humanitarian space and transport has allowed 
child victims of these invisible barriers to have access to education. 
The extent to which the living conditions of refugees and asylum seekers 
in neighbouring countries targeted by DG ECHO’s action have improved, 
including the meeting of basic needs as defined by SPHERE standards 
(JC 3.3) 
The UNHCR, DG ECHO’s implementing partner in addressing the needs of 
PNIPs, has based its assistance on the strengthening of the receiving communities 
and this approach has had positive effects on the living conditions of the 
populations targeted and especially on non-discriminatory access by PNIPs to 
services. Ecuador is the first host country for Colombian refugees, with a total of 59,100.60 
According to a UNHCR survey it is estimated that 50% of refugees live in extreme poverty 
(less than 1 US dollar per person per day). This population (in particular Afro-Colombians 
and indigenous minorities) often falls victim to discrimination which further hampers their 
access to the most basic rights recognised by the GoE. In the light of this the UNHCR has 
                                                 
60  As per UNHCR 2012-2013 appeal. This figure does not include other PNIPs groups.  
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adopted a community-based approach aimed at improving the living conditions of PNIPs 
and their host community and at preventing violent xenophobic acts.  
The UNHCR has also sought to establish partnerships with other UN agencies and NGOs 
in order to tackle the needs of these communities in an integrated fashion. For example, 
while it has addressed the needs in WASH, it has also relied on the WFP for food and on 
Oxfam for developing a longer-term food security project based on agriculture. 
Furthermore, this type of support has been an incentive for local authorities to improve the 
supply of services in those communes receiving PNIPs. An illustration was the financing of 
school classrooms after the UNHCR had financed construction of latrines and 
rehabilitation of water system in schools, such as in the Escuela Hugo Ortiz visited in Lago 
Agrio. 
Despite the capacities of the UNHCR and its knowledge of the situation of Colombians 
who have fled to Ecuador, refugee status is only given by the GoE, and UNHCR has had 
no further access to the registration centres since the new decree was promulgated. In 
other words the UNHCR does not have full control over the effectiveness of its 
interventions in the sense that it depends largely on the granting of this status. 
The effectiveness of DG ECHO’s support to refugees and asylum seekers has been 
strongly influenced by the national legislation of the GoE. In September 2008 the 
GoE presented its newly-adopted Policy on Asylum. It was the first country in Latin 
America to develop a specific policy on refugee issues.  The asylum policy included the 
institutional strengthening and decentralization of the General Directorate for Refugees 
and a new Enhanced Registration mechanism to register, recognize and document refugees 
through mobile brigades in the relevant provinces. The policy also envisaged the legal, 
social and economic integration of refugees in Ecuador. As a result the UNHCR 
encouraged registration through this new enhanced mechanism, and the number of 
recognised refugees increased from 19,482 at the end of 2008 to 45,192 a year later. 
However, in 2011 the General Directorate for Refugees put this enhanced registration on 
hold. Furthermore a new decree was adopted by the GoE with stricter criteria for 
registration, notably imposition of a 15-day delay after which applicants are no longer 
eligible.61 In the light of this change of procedure the UNHCR had to reduce the number 
of beneficiaries targeted by DG ECHO’s intervention.  
                                                 
61  This change of policy may be explained by the complains from several reception provinces (San Lorenzo, Ibarra, 
Tulcan, Esmeraldas, Sucumbios) about the fact that Government support to the refugee registration process had not 
been coupled with budget increase to address the needs of this population; another element is the normalization of 
diplomatic relations between Ecuador and Colombia and the wish to minimize the effect of the internal conflict in 
Colombia. 
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Evaluation Question 4 on LRRD 
To what extent were conditions conducive to an effective LRRD? What 
were the main challenges or achievements? 
 
Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD), or ensuring connectedness, has been a central 
theme of evaluations of DG ECHO interventions since the late 1990s.62 LRRD is not simply a matter of 
ensuring “a smooth transition from emergency to development assistance”, it also implies consideration of the 
broader context and the actions that can be taken as part of “an integrated approach” to a return to 
structural stability.63  In Colombia the broader context consists of a man-made crisis that has lasted for over 
40 years and a post-conflict situation that has not yet been arrived at. An approach focusing on transition 
is not fully relevant in such a protracted crisis. The challenge is rather how to undertake simultaneous 
humanitarian and development actions in a concerted way so that both types of need are addressed. The 
question therefore does not focus on a linear progression from relief to rehabilitation and thence to 
development, but rather on existing conditions that could favour LRRD. It has two dimensions: with 
respect to past support it aims at understanding what the achievements were in terms of LRRD, whether 
conditions were present for implementing an LRRD approach, and what challenges were met in this respect; 
from there on it also aims at assessing whether at the end of the evaluation period the conditions for an 
effective LRRD approach were fulfilled. Furthermore this question seeks to evaluate connectedness from 
both macro and micro perspectives, from the level of national institutions to that of local livelihoods. 
 
EQ 4 on LRRD  – Answer Summary Box 
LRRD has been a genuine concern of DG ECHO for years and this is reflected in its 
strategy documents and in the selection process for its projects. However the 
opportunity to promote an LRRD approach based on complementarities between DG 
ECHO and the development services of the Commission has not been exploited. 
Despite this missed opportunity DG ECHO has been able to implement handover and 
exit strategies successfully.  
DG ECHO has sought to promote LRRD in two ways, by focusing on government 
institutions and by developing complementarities with other Commission aid instruments. 
The first path through government institutions has been difficult to implement in the 
context of an armed conflict especially when the government is a party to the conflict. With 
respect to the second path, strategic planning of DG ECHO interventions has not taken 
into account the EU development strategy, which is missing an opportunity to develop an 
effective LRRD approach based on concerted actions between DG ECHO and the 
Commission development programmes. The possibility of developing some connection was 
also hampered by the use of different financing instruments and the delay in development 
programmes reaching an implementation phase. The problem worsened with the 
suppression of the Uprooted People thematic budget line in 2006.   
Nevertheless at intervention level the selection process for DG ECHO interventions has 
created opportunities for developing an LRRD approach, even though difficult conditions 
have sometimes impeded implementation of the planned approach. The result is that some 
progress has been made with respect to LRRD in addressing the needs of IDPs, confined 
communities and refugees at intervention level. 
Finally, the recent political changes created structural conditions favourable for an effective 
                                                 
62  ECHO, Manual for the Evaluation of Humanitarian Aid, 1999, p.12; ALNAP, Evaluating humanitarian action using the 
OECD-DAC criteria: An ALNAP guide for humanitarian agencies, 2006, p.29. 
63  European Commission, “Linking Reflief, Rehabilitation and Development – An assessment” COM (2001) 153, pp. 3-
2. 
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LRRD approach based on a strategy for a hand-over to the Colombian State. Nevertheless 
Colombia is not yet in a post-crisis situation and therefore no effective macro LRRD 
approach that presupposes peace can be envisaged. Furthermore, gaps in humanitarian 
assistance remain. 
The extent to which the need for an LRRD approach was taken into 
account by DG ECHO at the design stage of its strategy and interventions 
(JC 4.1) 
The strategic planning of DG ECHO interventions has not taken into account the 
EU development strategy, thereby missing an opportunity to develop an effective 
LRRD approach based on concerted actions between DG ECHO and Commission 
development programmes. 
While the need to have an LRRD approach was explicit in the design of DG ECHO’s 
annual strategies, no reference was made to the EU development strategy for the period 
2007-2013. Nevertheless this challenge at implementation level should not have prevented 
DG ECHO from taking the EU country strategy into account. 
All Global Plans and HIPs over the evaluation period mentioned that LRRD would be 
promoted mainly in two ways: 
 by focusing on Government institutions, that is using assistance to build up the 
capacity of relevant institutions involved in the humanitarian response provided by the 
GoC; and 
 by developing existing complementarities between DG ECHO and interventions under 
other Commission aid instruments such as the Development Cooperation Instrument 
for Latin America (DCI). 
However, despite this approach no reference was made to the EU response strategy for 
2007-2013. This is all the more unfortunate as the latter had a LRRD rationale and 
consisted of three main steps: 
 to achieve a short-term impact on the conflict in Colombia, the EU would first provide 
assistance to the victims; 
 to achieve a medium-term effect on the conflict in Colombia, the EU would endeavour 
to promote peace at local and national levels; 
 to achieve a long-term effect on the conflict in Colombia, the EU would strive to 
promote development for all.64 
The CSP does mention that a“link needs to be made between the emergency humanitarian aid provided 
by ECHO and bilateral cooperation funds (sector 1 of the National Indicative Programme)”. But 
sector 1, namely Peace and Stability, including Alternative Development, which represented 70% 
of the NIP, is not mentioned in DG ECHO’s annual strategies over that period. There was 
the challenge that most of the Commission development assistance was channelled through 
the GoC and that the latter had difficulty in accessing zones where DG ECHO operations 
were being implemented (mostly because of lack of security for GoC civil servants who 
might be targeted by illegal groups). Nevertheless, other aid modalities were used and the 
HIPs mention the different instruments that can be used, such as the EIDHR, the DCI 
thematic programmes, or the IfS; but no reference is made to the content, such as the 
specific objective of the EU response under Sector 1 which is to support stabilisation of 
                                                 
64  European Commission, Country Strategy Paper: Colombia, 2007-2013, pp.24-25. 
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the socio-economic situation of people, communities and victims of the armed conflict, 
including displaced people and victims of mines and weapons left behind after hostilities.65  
Despite this missed opportunity to embed DG ECHO’s actions in the Sector 1 
response of the EU over the period 2007-2013, DG ECHO has genuinely been 
concerned that its emergency support should be connected to longer-term planning 
and in this sense has influenced the design of its implementing partners’ 
interventions. 
From 2009 onwards HIPs encouraged implementing partners to devise a handover and exit 
strategy and this has contributed to mainstreaming LRRD in the design of interventions.66 
The five case studies selected for this evaluation all had in their design an element 
favouring LRRD, even though this was not necessarily phrased as such in project 
proposals. To give examples: 
 FAO in the department of Córdoba: enhancing the capacity of a local actor, in this 
case the Church, the Pastoral Social de Montelibano; and establishing partnerships with 
local agencies and authorities, in this case the Instituto Colombiano Agropecuario and the 
agricultural technical assistance offered by municipalities.  
 ICRC in the department of Valle del Cauca: enhancing the capacity of both 
governmental (UAOs) and non-governmental actors, namely the Colombian Red 
Cross; and improvement of the livelihoods and resilience of targeted communities in 
conflict zones, notably indigenous communities.67 
 Save the Children UK in Medellin: strategy for handover to local authorities of 
education programmes for IDP children.  
 Solidaridad Internacional in the department of Nariño: establishing partnerships 
with local authorities, in this case Tumaco, on development and social policies.  
 UNHCR in Ecuador: two-stage approach to assisting refugees and asylum seekers, 
the first focused on relief, the second on integration with the aim of handing over to 
the GoE activities geared to integration. Another element was partnership with a local 
NGO, in this case the Fundación Tarabita. 
In addition, implementing partners have become increasingly aware in recent years of the 
necessity to avoid substitution for government activities. The ICRC, which is one of the 
three families through which DG ECHO delivers its humanitarian assistance and which 
has been receiving 24% of EU funding over the evaluation period, explained in this respect 
that its strategy was revised approximately three years ago with a view to combining 
substitution with institutional capacity-building. Before then they had an agreement with 
Acción Social to intervene only when the institution was unable to, but this had led Acción 
Social to rely too much on ICRC assistance instead of developing its own capacity.  
The extent to which DG ECHO has verified, prior to implementation, the 
fulfillment of conditions for an effective LRRD approach and progress 
made in terms of transition from short-term relief to rehabilitation and 
                                                 
65  Idem, p.28. 
66  All the interventions selected as case studies started in 2010; it would have been interesting to compare their design 
with that of interventions undertaken before 2009. Nevertheless, there is no reason to believe that implementing 
partners were not receptive to indications mentioned in the HIP especially when they have described the HIP as a 
“reference document” during the focus group gathered for this evaluation. 
67  The evaluation team took advantage of its presence in Medellin to also visit the ICRC there. Similar LRRD 
approaches were witnessed taking advantage that the Colombian Red Cross is especially strong and well organized in 
the department of Antioquia. 
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development at the level of different sectors of intervention (JC 4.2 and JC 
4.3) 
DG ECHO’s selection process for projects has allowed assessment of opportunities 
for an effective LRRD approach prior to implementation, but the difficult 
conditions intrinsic to humanitarian crises such as lack of security have sometimes 
impeded implementation of the planned approach. Implementing partners were 
requested to submit Single Forms for a detailed assessment of their proposals by DG 
ECHO. These forms contain two sections in which the partners had to describe the 
“expected level of sustainability and/or connectedness” and the “Continuum strategy (Linking Relief, 
Rehabilitation and Development)”. This standardized procedure has allowed DG ECHO to 
cross-check information received by different implementing partners, namely NGOs, UN 
agencies and the Red Cross Movement. Furthermore DG ECHO has been questioning its 
partners on an annual basis in respect of which projects they would consider undertaking in 
an LRRD perspective and of what would be the conditions for the projects being feasible. 
Despite these measures to ensure that activities would be carried out in a context that takes 
longer-term issues into consideration, it still happened over the evaluation period that exit 
strategies for projects were blocked or had to be adjusted because of unforeseen 
developments. This was the case for the intervention implemented by Solidaridad 
Internacional in the department of Nariño where “The intended process of appropriation by public 
institutions of the sustainability of the project has failed, due to security issues in the area of 
implementation.”68 The ICRC was also considering withdrawing some of its support to 
Acción Social at the end of 2011 but had to revise its position following the institutional 
changes which took place in late 2011 and early 2012 and which placed a heavy 
administrative burden on UAOs, affecting their capacity to register IDPs in a timely 
manner. 
LRRD was also hampered by a lack of concerted action between DG ECHO and 
the Commission’s development programmes. In addition, the reform of the 
financing instruments undertaken in 2006 further undermined the efforts that were 
in place. As mentioned in the Global Plans and HIPs, one way chosen by DG ECHO of 
promoting LRRD was by developing existing complementarities between DG ECHO and 
interventions under other Commission aid instruments. But this strategic approach has not 
materialized at intervention level. This is a challenge that the humanitarian and 
development services of the Commission have been facing for a long time. The ALNAP 
Annual Review 2001 already noted at that time that “the report highlights the problem of the lack 
of connection between ECHO and EC development departments, which has been noted in a number of 
ECHO evaluations.  
The main challenge has been that DG ECHO works in conflict zones where it is difficult 
to bring in development actors, including the Commission. The other challenge has been 
the timing of projects: humanitarian operations can be approved within 15 days while 
development interventions, even if financed under the IfS which was conceived as an 
emergency instrument, take about a year to reach the implementation phase.  According to 
EUD representatives and DG ECHO’s implementing partners, this problem worsened 
with the reform of financial instruments in 2006 and the suppression of the thematic 
budget line for Uprooted People (UP). Indeed this thematic budget line used to allow both 
to intervene in regions characterised by high levels of displacement, since their respective 
                                                 
68  Fichop Solidaridad Internacional 2009 for the action : “Access and Humanitarian assistance to population affected by 
the conflict within the territories from ethnic communities in Valle Del Cauca and Nariño”, p.48. 
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interventions focused on IDPs; and although different instruments were used, the 
implementing partners were the same. These elements used to foster regular participation 
(i.e. not ad hoc) in DG ECHO and EUD activities respectively (planning, preparation of 
calls for proposals, ToRs, etc) as well as in operational undertakings such as missions, 
sharing of information on security or humanitarian situations, and promotion of links 
between emergency and rehabilitation in regions or with beneficiaries covered by both 
interventions. 
DG ECHO had sought to anticipate the gap left by the suppression of the UP budget line 
at the time by scheduling “regular meetings during 2007 in order to ensure coordination between 
actions funded by the National Indicative Programme and those funded by DG ECHO” but these 
apparently have not been sufficient to bridge the funding gap. In recent months initiatives 
have been taken by the EUD and the DG ECHO office to explore how coordination 
between the two might be improved during the next programming cycle and which 
financial instruments might be used.  
Nevertheless some progress has been made with respect to LRRD in addressing 
the needs of IDPs, confined communities and refugees at intervention level. The 
ALNAP guide for evaluating humanitarian action emphasizes that too often evaluations, 
when assessing LRRD, focus on the strategic and macro levels when the livelihood or 
resilience support aspect of specific interventions is also worth taking into consideration.69 
The progress described below applied at both macro and micro levels: 
 With respect to IDPs: DG ECHO’s interventions have created safe environments in 
which children and young people can return to their schools and enjoy different 
activities which keep them far from gangs, armed groups and illegal activities. Flexible 
and informal learning methodologies were conceived with and for the children and 
young adolescents as a viable alternative to formal education; nowadays local 
governments are supporting former “ECHO Houses”. 
 With respect to confined communities: implementing partners of DG ECHO have 
increasingly supported identification of places for confined communities, Sitios de 
Asamblea Permanente (SAP), as an auto-protection measure. The communities 
themselves identify a place such as a school or a community hall where they can store 
all the non-food items that the community members will need should they need to 
move during a conflict. This prevents them from becoming permanently displaced and 
allows them to keep control over their land which is often their source of livelihood.  
Another type of support improving the resilience of these communities was the health 
care brigades that have in some cases been handed over to the Colombian Red Cross.  
 With respect to refugees: over the years, DG ECHO’s support has created an 
incentive for local authorities to invest in and improve the supply of services to 
recipient communities.  
                                                 
69  ALNAP, Evaluating humanitarian action using the OECD-DAC criteria: an ALNAP guide for humanitarian agencies, 
2006, pp. 31-32  
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The extent to which conditions at the end of the period called for and were 
favourable to an effective LRRD approach in the future (JC 4.4) 
The political changes initiated in 2010 created structural conditions favourable to an 
LRRD approach based on a hand-over strategy to the Colombian State. 
Nevertheless, Colombia is not yet in a post-crisis situation and therefore no 
effective macro LRRD approach based on peace can be envisaged and gaps in 
humanitarian assistance remain.  As mentioned above, DG ECHO has sought to 
promote LRRD by focusing on government institutions. The government has indeed a 
leading role to play in connecting international humanitarian assistance with the 
development aid received. However, this approach has been challenging to implement in 
Colombia owing to the armed conflict and to the fact that the government is a party to the 
conflict. The election of President Santos brought about important and to some extent 
unexpected political changes.70 The GoC recognized the existence of an internal conflict, 
even acknowledging the responsibility of the State in the victimization, and finally it 
acknowledged that a sustainable solution to the conflict required measures to assist the 
victims. In this context the GoC reaffirmed that the Colombian State must be the primary 
humanitarian actor in the crisis. To this end it dissolved the former Acción Social and has 
been developing two units – the Victims Unit and the Risk Management Unit - to address 
both types of humanitarian crisis. Furthermore it has adopted the Victims Law which 
guarantees restitution of land and financial compensation for victims of the conflict. These 
changes, along with the important aspect of giving legitimacy to humanitarian operations, 
are important structural developments on which an effective LRRD approach can be 
based. 
Nevertheless the institutional reforms were managed in such a way that the institutional 
memory of Acción Social was lost, undermining the capacity of the Colombian State to 
address humanitarian needs, at least in the short term. In addition the Victims Law 
envisages IDPs being assisted during the first 90 days of their displacement by local 
authorities – namely UAOs - before the new Victims Unit takes up this support at national 
level. As noted above this has put a heavy administrative burden on UAOs that have had 
problems coping with the flow of IDPs. Furthermore, while the individual registration of 
an IDP used to last approximately one hour under the new format, the procedure can now 
take 3-4 hours.  
 
Finally, the primary objective of the law is to achieve national reconciliation and lasting and 
sustainable peace (art. 8, 9, 11, 12, 33). The problem, as recognized by President Santos 
himself, is the persistence of the armed conflict, making it difficult to refer to reconciliation 
and peace, even less to a “lasting and stable peace” (art. 9).71 Victims of “common criminal 
acts” are furthermore not covered by the law. In other words the victims of the BACRIMs 
which were responsible for the greatest number of unilateral violent acts between 2008 and 
2010 (see Chapter 2) are not officially considered victims. The humanitarian needs of this 
population were being covered at the end of the evaluation period by international 
assistance. The persistence of the conflict also means that the population is in need of 
protection and that the humanitarian principles of independence and neutrality must be 
respected, requiring the involvement of the international community.  
                                                 
70  Juan Manuel Santos was Alvaro Uribe’s Minister of National Defense and many observers thought that the position 
of the GoC vis-à-vis the internal conflict would remain unchanged. 
71  PODEC, “Ley 1448 de 2011 de víctimas y restitución de tierra: Análisis y recomendaciones para la cooperación 
internacional” Cuadernos de Cooperación y Desarrollo, N°7 september 2011, p.4. 
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Evaluation Question 5 on urban context interventions 
Is ECHO an appropriate donor to address humanitarian consequences 
emerging from urban violent context in Colombia? Considering 
ECHO’s mandate and timeframes, what would be DG ECHO’s added 
value? 
Columbia has an estimated population of around 46 million, about 76% of which live in urban areas. 
Displacements due to the conflict took place very often towards the major cities and urban centres72, totalling 
close to 3.5 million between 2000 and 2011 according to DPS/Unidad de Atención a Victimas73. This 
created a number of humanitarian needs, notably due to the violent urban context in Colombia. 
DGECHO’s support in urban areas in Colombia has included provision of emergency assistance to IDPs 
(non-food items, food, shelter, cash and vouchers) and basic services (health, education, water and sanitation) 
to the recipient communities, for example through the interventions of the ICRC, Save the Children or 
UNHCR. Protection was targeted through the implementation of education and awareness actions in 
marginal urban areas to protect children from violence and abuse such as recruitment by illegal armed 
groups. Nevertheless, addressing humanitarian needs in urban violent contexts in Colombia has not so far 
been the focus of DG ECHO’s support and was thus not prominently analysed in previous HIPs. 
However, as reflected by the 2010 IASC strategy on meeting humanitarian challenges in urban areas74, 
there is a growing recognition that the Humanitarian Community needs to adapt to the humanitarian trend 
of increasing urban vulnerabilities. There is also ongoing DG ECHO reflection on possible strengthened 
engagement in urban settings; hence the future-oriented elements of the evaluation question for Colombia and 
possibly the region. 
This question will thus seek to assess (i) current and anticipated gaps in terms of support provided by the 
Government and donors to addressing humanitarian needs in urban contexts in Colombia, (ii) the 
appropriateness of DG ECHO’s support to addressing humanitarian needs in urban contexts of different 
dimensions, with a focus based on lessons learnt from previous interventions in Colombia, and (iii) taking 
into account its mandate and timeframes, the extent to which DG ECHO would provide value added in 
addressing humanitarian needs in urban contexts, particularly in Colombia. Linkages with urban 
interventions in Ecuador and the region will be highlighted wherever they provide further arguments in the 
context of the question. 
 
                                                 
72  While secondary displacement are not accounted for, most primary displacement in rural or smaller urban centers 
result over time in secondary displacement to major urban centers where intra-urban displacement also frequently 
occur. 
73  OCHA Colombia Displacement chart by year 2000 - 2010.  
74  The IASC Strategy on Meeting Humanitarian Challenges in Urban Areas and its two years action plan was approved 
on in Rome on 10 November 2010 by the 78th IASC Working Group Meeting. Strategic Objective 1 refers to the  
development of  operational strategies early-on that ensure multi-stakeholder partnerships for enhanced coordination, 
impact and effectiveness of humanitarian assistance in urban areas, and Strategic Objective 4 sets up the promotion 
of Protection to vulnerable urban populations against violence and exploitation 
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EQ 5 on urban context interventions  – Answer Summary Box 
Several factors plead in favour of DG ECHO as an appropriate donor for addressing 
humanitarian consequences of urban violence in Colombia. There is a sustained need 
for support in this respect: different stakeholders call for a ‘neutral’ actor to provide this 
support; it would be in line with DG ECHO’s mandate; and DG ECHO has proved 
through past interventions that it had specific types of assets in this respect.   
Different factors allow it to be stated that over the period considered  there was a real 
need for humanitarian support in urban areas and that this will continue to be the case 
in the near future:  
 humanitarian partners increasingly recognise that urban humanitarian needs have not 
sufficiently been addressed; the reasons invoked are twofold: they were insufficiently 
documented, which can be linked to lack of recognition of problems linked to the 
BACRIM; and there has been a consensus among humanitarian donors that they should 
concentrate their assistance in zones where government presence was limited;  
 capacities to address the IDP caseloads in urban centres are stretched to the limit; 
 owing to secondary displacements, IDPs’ needs are continuously increased; 
 some specific groups (e.g. indigenous communities) continue to face specific difficulties.  
 
Moreover, different elements advocate a neutral and impartial alternative, notably in the 
context of a protection vacuum: 
 the Victims Law does not cover victims of the BACRIMs, leaving a vacuum; 
 humanitarian partners, government institutions and communities call for a neutral and 
impartial alternative, notably to cover victim groups either unable or unwilling to register 
with authorities; 
 such interventions would also be beneficial to national NGOs.  
 
Intervening in such a context would be in line with DG ECHO’s mandate. There is 
indeed a wide consensus that protection should be addressed similarly to other sectors, whereby 
humanitarian response should be triggered based on relevant criteria for measuring the level of 
abuse or the humanitarian consequences of urban violence. This approach is in line with DG 
ECHO’s mandate.  
 
DG ECHO has proved to have several assets and provide specific added value to qualify 
it as an appropriate donor for addressing the humanitarian consequences of urban 
violence in Colombia, viz::  
 in the past DG ECHO has intervened in urban contexts in Colombia in an ‘appropriate’ 
manner, i.e. addressing the right needs, being complementary to the Government, 
contributing to increased accountability on the part of government authorities, and 
generating incentives for improvements in non-discriminatory services; 
 some specific approaches such as a community approach to basic needs support or a ‘cash 
& voucher’ approach as means to ensure protection have also proved useful in this respect;  
 DG ECHO is perceived as the major humanitarian donor in Colombia alongside the 
Government, which confers on it different types of value added, viz::  
- its critical mass can help shape the humanitarian agenda of the Government, notably 
with respect to intervening in the urban context; 
- it can use its leverage to encourage other donors to intervene in these zones; 
- it can maintain a focus on need (visibility).  
 
When undertaking interventions in urban areas, ECHO would need to tackle a number 
of limitations it was confronted with when implementing similar interventions in the 
past. These concerns both the duration of the projects and the need for improved 
institutionalised know-how in interventions in urban settings in the region, particularly in the 
area of protection.  
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Current and expected gaps in terms of support provided by the 
Government and donors to address humanitarian needs in urban contexts 
in Colombia (JC 5.2)75 
Several elements show that there was, and still is, a real need for humanitarian 
support in urban contexts, and that this will also be the case in the near future. 
Humanitarian partners increasingly recognise that urban humanitarian needs have 
been neglected. They call for support in this field, while acknowledging the 
consensus on the priority placed on vulnerable rural populations, and hence 
underlining the importance of having sufficient funding for both rural and urban 
support. 
 Although the 2011-2012 Common Humanitarian Framework (CHF 2011-2012)76 for 
Colombia highlights that “the marginal neighbourhoods of big and middle – size cities receive the 
majority of IDPs cases”, it nevertheless maintained a broad (though not exclusive) focus 
on rural support. Interviewees cited several explanations:  
- needs in urban settings in Colombia have been insufficiently documented; 
interviewees met linked this to insufficient recognition of BACRIM and hence of 
the conflict;  
- given the limited funding for humanitarian aid, donors decided to focus their 
response on zones where government presence was limited77.   
 Capacities to address the IDP caseloads in medium and large urban centres are 
stretched to the limit. Indeed with the passing of the Victims Law, the institutional 
restructuration of late-2011/early-2012, and the high turnover of government officials, 
an unprecedented burden was placed on the municipal level, while the centralized 
registration process itself has yet to become operational. With the increased caseload 
this burden even affected larger urban centres, which calls for complementary support. 
Local authorities in these big urban centres openly expressed this need for support.  
 Moreover, owing to secondary displacements (either towards bigger urban centres or 
intra-urban) IDPs’ needs are continuously increased. These displacements are caused 
by the search for livelihoods in the current limbo of effective implementation of 
restitution in the framework of the Victim Law, or as a protection mechanism against 
abuse, gender-based violence and forced recruitment78.  
 Some groups such as indigenous communities, Afro-Colombians, women, and elderly 
and disabled people, face specific difficulties as insufficient attention has been placed 
on avoiding the reproduction of discrimination and exclusion schemes. Indeed, 
specific challenges are faced by those vulnerable groups when they live in an urban 
context for the first time and face a de-structuring of their social organization and 
culture. Interviewees underlined for instance that indigenous communities are strongly 
affected as they develop negative coping mechanisms such as prostitution and begging. 
Women victims of gender-based violence are additionally vulnerable as they may not 
trust the authorities to obtain assistance, necessitating an alternative form of support 
until they feel confident enough to approach official services. In this respect, the 
                                                 
75  With a view to increase the readability of the answer to the question, the order of the JCs has been changed.  
76  As for August 2012, the document was yet to be approved by Government of Colombia 
77  An interviewee explainedthat the drafting of the CHF was more based on its potential to secure limited donors 
funding (for rural context) than on a complete and holistic analysis of humanitarian needs (that would highlight urban 
needs).  
78  According to the 2011 Red Cross Report “efecto del desplazamiento interno en las comunidades de recepción”p1, 5, 62% of state 
registered IDPs are of rural origin and settle in urban settings. More than 8% have had more than one displacement 
including intra-urban displacements. 
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presence of the State does not necessarily guarantee provision of non-discriminatory 
access to basic services. 
 
There is a protection vacuum in cities, pointing to the need for a neutral and 
impartial alternative such as that provided by humanitarian interventions 
 The current Victims Law in Colombia does not recognize BACRIMs as a party in 
conflict thus their victims are not entitled to support through the criteria of the victim 
law. These BACRIMs are highly active in urban violent contexts in Colombia and 
generate a range of humanitarian consequences, particularly affecting children, notably 
through forced recruitment, gender-based violence, intra-urban confinement or 
homicides. There is in this sense a legal protection vacuum. Children are also affected in 
the sense that, as explained by an OHCHR Medellin interviewee, it is estimated that up 
to 80% of members of criminal groups in the city are minors.  
 The need for a neutral and impartial alternative as offered by organizations such as DG 
ECHO funded Save the Children and CEDECIS is widely recognized by humanitarian 
partners, governmental institutions and communities.79 Indeed, protection activities such 
as education, psycho-social support, awareness-raising interventions on the rights of 
children, as well as the development of alternative Roads of Attention (“Rutas de 
Atención”) to orient and take victims in charge, are considered very important by 
stakeholders and better able to ensure coverage of victim groups either unable (victims 
from BACRIMs unrecognized by the law, confined persons) or unwilling (those who 
fear discrimination80) to register with the authorities (operational protection vacuum). 
 It was also mentioned during interviews that without international humanitarian 
funding, NGOs (more particularly national) would suffer from political pressure, 
stigmatization and possibly closure, resulting in minimization of their influence on 
urban conflicts81. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that initiatives are already being taken in terms of 
enhancing responses to humanitarian consequences of violent conflict in the 
country. The ICRC is currently developing a pilot protection project82 in Medellin that has 
already identified vulnerable communes where humanitarian assistance is required, taking 
account of several indicators83 for measuring the humanitarian consequences of urban 
violence including invisible borders (partial confinement), access, weapon proliferation, 
access to public services such as health centres and schools, forced recruitment, GBV, 
stigmatisation, homicides, and disappearances.  
                                                 
79   That was confirmed during the roundtable evaluation team interview in Medellin on 17 august 2012 with ICBF, ICRC 
and Save the Children. 
80  For examples of reticence to address governmental authorities such as ICBF, see the evaluation team interview with a 
mother from the community in Villa Turbay on 16 august 2012 in Medellin “I would prefer that my children do not mix with 
bad children, here there are many problems of sexual harassment including between children, domestic violence due to poverty, lack of food, 
abandon of kids, and then comes the ICBF to take the children and leave the family crying”.   
81  An interviewee stated in this respect « if you ask me if DG ECHO funding is necessary, the suspension of funding would 
demotivate organizations such as Save the Children and CEDECIS on top of the stigmatization that has been operated that if they do 
not support the official government discourse… they would tend to disappear”. 
82  The project is taking place in cities of Colombia, Brazil, Mexico and Honduras. It is not currently supported by DG 
ECHO.  
83  Part of them already similar to Save the Children criteria, thus the current plans to collaborate, evaluation team 
interview in Medellin ICBF, ICRC, SC roundtable on 17 august 2012 
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Lessons learnt on the ‘appropriateness’ of DG ECHO’s support to address 
humanitarian needs in urban contexts in Colombia (JC 5.1) 
Over the evaluation period, interventions by DG ECHO’s partners in terms of 
assistance (emergency and basic services) to IDPs and host communities in urban 
contexts in Colombia (both municipalities and major urban centres) have been 
addressing the right needs and are recognized as such by the Government at 
different levels as well as by the beneficiaries. With the institutional restructuring of 
late 2011 and early 2012 there was an acute need, recognised by the Government, for 
assistance to IDPs from DG ECHO interventions. The continued support provided via 
ICRC in Medellin and Cali to assist IDPs, for example, was considered key by the 
authorities, and resulted in extended duration of the projects in urban settings despite the 
initial plan for phasing-out. Furthermore, in the case of confined or semi-confined urban 
communities, DG ECHO’s implementing partners may have been the only provider of 
support as, for example, in the intervention of Solidaridad Internacional in the Barrio 
Nueva Esperanza in Tumaco. 
 
There are also indications that interventions by DG ECHO’s partners have 
contributed to the increased accountability on the part of government authorities 
and generated incentives for improvements in non-discriminatory public services.  
 Protection interventions in urban settings in Colombia have generated incentives for 
municipalities to improve their response in this field; as an example of good practice the 
Secretariat of Civic Culture of Medellin took over the support of “community 
participation spaces” initially implemented by Save the Children and called “Echo 
House”. 
 DG ECHO’s support for UNHCR interventions in urban settings (municipalities and 
capital) in Ecuador have proved quite effective in terms of LRRD and have increased 
accountability on the part of government authorities for provision of non-
discriminatory access to basic services for Ecuadorians and Colombian Persons in Need 
of International Protection (PNIPs). Water and sanitation projects implemented in 
schools by communities hosting Colombian refugees and PNIPs have stimulated 
intervention by the authorities to complement the provision of services.  
 
Protection interventions by DG ECHO’s partners in urban contexts (both 
municipalities and major centres) have addressed specific needs and were 
complementary to those of the Government  
 DG ECHO’s partners’ protection interventions in Colombia addressed the Protection 
vacuum by providing a neutral and independent alternative response on the one hand 
and by supporting the efforts of the government on the other. For example, DG 
ECHO-funded Save the Children activities specifically focused on the violence faced by 
children in urban settlements with high concentrations of IDPs84 complementing the 
                                                 
84  Save the Children addresses protection needs in a holistic approach in the communities hosting IDPs without 
distinction between IDPs and non IDPs or the status of recognition of the criminal groups they were made victims 
from. 
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offer of services from the government in education (as a mean of preventing forced 
recruitment and abuse). 
 In Ecuador, alternative support provided by DG ECHO funded UNHCR intervention 
and its implementing partners to unregistered Persons in Need of International 
Protection (PNIPs) has also proved increasingly crucial, given the passing of a new 
decree in 2012 narrowing the criteria and admissibility for refugee status85. The non-
recognition of BACRIMs’ victims further hindered the registration of PNIPs for official 
assistance.  
Some specific approaches also proved useful:  
 A community approach to basic needs support has proved successful in preventing 
further discrimination and allowing identification of protection needs, in particular for 
children and adolescents at risk of forced recruitment or abuse. Indeed, both DG 
ECHO interventions implemented by Save the Children in Colombia and UNHCR in 
Ecuador identified children by means of continuous monitoring with the communities, 
thanks to the access provided by their sectoral interventions (education for SC, WASH 
for UNHCR). Assessing and responding to protection needs necessitates an adapted 
methodology, given the strong potential for discrimination, and also establishment of 
functional referral mechanisms such as Attention Roads, which have been strengthened 
by DG ECHO’s interventions86.  
 A cash & voucher approach has also proved adaptable to emergency responses to 
IDPs in Colombia and by PNIPs in Ecuador in urban contexts, owing to its flexibility, 
reduced visibility, market stimulation and lighter logistics. Cash & voucher approaches 
are by now an integral part of DG ECHO’s partners modalities of interventions such as 
those implemented by WFP and ICRC in Colombia and by Tarabita Fundación in 
Ecuador (under UNHCR mandate). They allow fast delivery of targeted assistance in 
urban contexts in the initial months after displacement and complement community 
support interventions providing for immediate needs.  
Potential value added of DG ECHO to address humanitarian needs in 
urban contexts in Colombia, taking into account its mandate and 
timeframes (JC 5.3) 
While several interpretations of the conflict dynamics in urban settings in Colombia 
can coexist, there is evidence that, based on relevant criteria87 measuring the 
humanitarian consequences of urban violence, the mandate to intervene for 
humanitarian organizations is fulfilled and compatible with DG ECHO’s mandate. 
Indeed, most actors are promoting the idea of addressing protection similarly in other 
sectors where humanitarian responses can be triggered based on relevant criteria88 
measuring the level of abuse or humanitarian consequences of urban violence89. That 
                                                 
85  Rejection rate was about 50% according to the Direction for Refugees in Lago Agrio for 2012 at the time of study. 
86  Evaluation team interviews on 24 august 2012 coordination table with UNHCR in Lago Agrio and on 16 august 2012 
with the community on Save the Children intervention in Comuna 8 Alticos in Medellin). 
87  ICRC indicators on urban violence to map high risk communes as well assessments by Save the Children and partners 
88  ICRC indicators on urban violence to map high risk communes as well assessments by Save the Children and partners 
89  For example, as expressed by UNHCR representative “a sectorial response in Protection measuring indicators of the 
level of abuse to trigger a humanitarian response as it exists in other sectors would be a good alternative” (see Annex 
4, EQ5, JC 5.2) 
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approach is fully compatible with ECHO’s mandate and is already the basis of the 
identification of DG ECHO’s urban interventions such as those with Save the Children.90 
DG ECHO is perceived as the major humanitarian donor in Colombia alongside 
the government. This provides it with different potential assets:  
 building on the critical mass it can play a key role in helping shape the humanitarian 
agenda of the Government ;  
 it may stimulate other donors to join;  
 it can play a key role in keeping attention focused on humanitarian needs, including 
those in urban contexts.  
  
ECHO’s support in urban areas had also limitations, notably in terms of time-frame 
and with respect to the availability of institutionalised know-how. This would need 
to be tackled when in future ECHO takes on interventions in urban areas in the 
region. 
 
 The one-year duration of DG ECHO-funded projects was often sufficient either to 
address immediate needs or to stimulate government authorities to provide non-
discriminatory services. The limited duration of assistance prevented substitution for 
the government and reduced potential discrimination between IDPs and impoverished 
hosting communities. Achievements in protection were also measurable in terms of 
prevention of recruitment, immediate psycho-social support and opening up of 
alternative humanitarian space.  
 Nevertheless, despite valuable efforts from DG ECHO’s partners to combine DG 
ECHO’s short-term funding with medium-term funding from other sources, the one-
year duration limit generated constraints on improved self-sufficiency, enhanced 
coordination, linking of relief with rehabilitation, and complementarity. Indeed, in 
terms of emergency assistance, institutional capacities (post-2011/2012 reorganisation) 
are not yet viable without external support and capacity-building. Moreover, the 
admissibility time for IDPs to receive assistance was too short, it therefore excluded 
assistance to secondary and intra-urban displacements currently unaccounted for. It 
also hindered the capacity to sustain advocacy, strengthen Attention Roads and initiate 
policy changes, elements of the protection vacuum that were compatible with DG 
ECHO’s mandate in communes in which levels of violence generated great 
                                                 
90  There is a consensus amongst humanitarian actors that armed groups including BACRIMs are widely active in urban 
contexts in Colombia and that their activities generate grave humanitarian consequences. As mentioned by an 
interviewee “post-demobilized groups are very present, the IDPs flew towards cities to protect themselves but the conflict followed them 
and is now taking place in urban contexts. In terms of Protection, it is a necessity that the humanitarian community intervenes”. In the 
same line another interviewee stated that “the ICRC observed that urban actors may be different but the humanitarian conditions 
remain the same”. However, humanitarian interventions to address urban violence have been caught in a political and 
policy debate on IHL versus IHRL or more broadly whether response to urban violence should fall under the 
humanitarian or development agendas. On one hand there is ample justification to advocate for an inclusion of the 
BACRIMs as a party in the conflict falling under IHL, thus under the scope of the Victims Law, which would provide 
a most adequate legal framework for humanitarian interventions in Colombian urban contexts. On the other hand, an 
IHRL approach may be more appropriate as it would allow a stronger public policy response beyond the Victims 
Law, that is to say independently of the recognition of BACRIMs (as stated by an interviewee: “The focus on IHL may 
be counterproductive as it could reduce the incentive for the government to give a complete institutional response beyond the Victims Law”). 
However, though the interpretation of the conflict dynamics is multiple, most partners agree to place the focus on the 
humanitarian consequences independently of the policy framework called upon (an interviewe explained in this 
respect: “there is no framework for the response in Protection […] the humanitarian consequences must be analyzed […] at the 
intersection of IHL and IHRL and there should be a discussion that focuses on those humanitarian consequences. There are restrictions in 
those urban zones that have everything to do with the access from the state and humanitarian action”.)  
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humanitarian consequences. Achievement of results in terms of protection greatly 
depended on acceptance of the humanitarian partner by the communities, government 
authorities and armed groups which required at least a medium-term presence. The 
identification of protection cases on a continuous monitoring basis with referral 
systems not only required longer implementation time but also a more coherent and 
coordinated identification of geographical areas of work. These elements illustrate that 
humanitarian needs, especially protection, cannot always be addressed in an emergency 
short-term fashion. Furthermore, if these target populations require projects that have 
a longer implementation time, this does not necessarily mean that they can be 
implemented by development actors, as per the arguments presented under EQ4 on 
LRRD as well as the difficulty of bringing in government and development actors in 
these conflict-affected areas, whether urban or rural. 
 There has so far been no institutionalized DG ECHO know-how on interventions in 
urban settings in the region, particularly in the field of protection91. However, pilot 
projects have been supported, lessons learned can be identified and the possibility of 
adopting a sectoral approach to protection may provide DG ECHO with an edge in 
addressing upcoming humanitarian trends and demonstrate leadership at national, 
regional and global levels.  
                                                 
91  « we are making pilot projects and not a know-how » (Annex 4, EQ5, JC5.3) 
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Evaluation Question 6 on the “three Cs”  
To what extent were the European Union’s humanitarian activities 
complementary to and coherent with those of other humanitarian actors 
and stakeholders? 
 
There is an overall consensus on the necessity to ensure that humanitarian activities undertaken by different 
actors and stakeholders are complementary and coherent. Indeed a lack of coordination can create gaps in 
the humanitarian response and have grave consequences for the targeted populations. The Council 
Regulation (EC) N° 1257/96 which created ECHO laid down from the outset the need to coordinate 
with EU MS, with international organizations and agencies (in particular the UN), and with third-
country donors.92 This question aims at assessing (i) whether, at policy level, the European Union had an 
explicit approach to enhancing coherence and complementarities , (ii) whether coordination mechanisms were 
created, and the European Commission’s role in this respect, and (iii) the extent to which the interventions 
of different actors were coherent and complementary with those implemented by the European Commission. 
 
EQ 6 on the three Cs  – Answer Summary Box 
DG ECHO was in a position to play a leading role in terms of coordination and of 
enhancing coherence and complementarities among humanitarian actors. However it 
did not fully take up this role partly because it was not in its mandate. Nevertheless, 
complementarities were achieved at implementation level thanks to DG ECHO’s 
strategy of filling gaps in the Colombian State’s humanitarian response and to a careful 
process of selecting implementing partners and projects.  
Even though DG ECHO does not have a mandate to coordinate, it could have had a leading 
role in coordinating and enhancing coherence and complementarities between humanitarian 
donors. Indeed, over the evaluation period: 
 DG ECHO was financially the most important humanitarian donor; 
 the EU had committed itself to stronger coordination, both within the EU (including with 
EU MS) and in terms of promoting a coherent international response to humanitarian 
crises; 
 DG ECHO has had a key role in keeping humanitarian assistance needs visible.  
 
However DG ECHO has not built further on this potential added value. While DG ECHO has 
been supportive of OCHA’s coordinating mechanisms, it was not in the forefront in terms of 
ensuring a common international response to the Colombian crisis. 
 
Nevertheless DG ECHO contributed to creating complementarities at implementation level: 
 by filling the gaps in the Colombian State’s humanitarian assistance 
 by including enhanced synergies with other actors in its selection criteria for projects 
                                                 
92  Council Regulation (EC) N°1257/96, Chapter II, Article 10. 
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The extent to which, at policy level, the European Union (and in particular 
DG ECHO) had an explicit approach to ensure that coherence and 
complementarities were enhanced (JC 6.1)  
The EU had an explicit approach in its policy framework to enhancing coherence 
and complementarities, and DG ECHO’s planning in Colombia took that into 
account. The Commission Communication on a European consensus on humanitarian aid 
(2007) called for enhanced EU coordination and for ensuring, vis-à-vis other humanitarian 
actors, “policy coherence, complementarity and effectiveness by using its tools and influence to address the 
root causes and prevention of humanitarian crisis.”93  Less than a year later the European 
Consensus on Humanitarian Aid was adopted.94 Since 2008 all DG ECHO’s Global Plans, 
as well as its last HIP for 2012, have mentioned coordination with the activities of other 
donors as part of DG ECHO’s strategy and have emphasised compliance with the 
European Consensus.95 
 
DG ECHO contributed to fostering coherence and complementarity among the 
different humanitarian actors and stakeholders in Colombia, notably through its 
participatory process for drawing up its planning documents. Furthermore DG 
ECHO has been key in keeping visible the need for humanitarian assistance. DG 
ECHO’s annual planning is a participatory process in which it calls for inputs from its 
partners, namely NGOs, UN agencies and the Red Cross. This structured sharing of 
information has been instrumental in promoting coherence between the actions undertaken 
by different partners. According to participants in a focus group of partners convened for 
this evaluation, DG ECHO: “fosters coordination thanks to its strategic documents”96. A 
representative of OCHA explained that the HIP was taken into consideration when OCHA 
decided on the allocation of CERF funds (Central Emergency Respond Fund). For this 
reason the organisation has sought each year to make a valuable input into the document 
so that it can increasingly be used as a reference by other donors. The HIP has also been 
accorded this importance as DG ECHO has been the largest donor (after the GoC) over 
the evaluation period. Based on data from the Financial Tracking Service of the UN Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the European Commission has contributed 
an average of 31% of total humanitarian aid to the country, a figure which increases 
substantially when combined with assistance from individual EU Member States. DG 
ECHO has also played an important role in maintaining humanitarian actors’ awareness of 
the existence of a crisis by applying its Forgotten Crisis Assessment to the Colombian case 
in each year of the evaluation period. 
 
                                                 
93  European Commission, “Towards a European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid” COM (2007) 317, p. 4. 
94  Joint statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the 
Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development Policy: “The European 
Consensus on Humanitarian Aid” (OJ C 25, 30.1.2008). 
95  Only the HIP 2011 while mentioning coordination as part of ECHO’s strategy did not explicitly referred to the 
European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. 
96  Focus group organized in Bogotá on 6 August 2012. NGOs and UN agencies were represented only the ICRC could 
not attend. 
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DG ECHO’s strategy aimed at complementing GoC’s actions over the evaluation 
period. While adjustments were made following the election of President Santos in 
2010, the Office of DG ECHO in Colombia has established fluid communication 
with the APC (Agencia Presidencial para la Cooperación) without prejudice to the 
Humanitarian Principles. The APC was created as a result of the institutional changes 
put in hand by President Santos. It has taken on board most of the functions performed by 
the former Acción Social. DG ECHO regards the APC as its main interlocutor. Its annual 
proposal is submitted to the APC so as to keep the GoC informed of future projects. Over 
the evaluation period DG ECHO’s strategy has been one of filling in the gaps that existed, 
for various reasons, in the humanitarian response of the Colombian State.  
The role of the EU (and in particular DG ECHO) in the establishment of 
coordination mechanisms (JC 6.2) 
DG ECHO contributed to the establishment of coordination mechanisms through 
the support it provided to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) set up by 
the UN in 2007 with a view to improving coordination between international actors.  
 The IASC was created with the aim of improving information exchange and 
strengthening coordination between humanitarian actors.97 Three thematic groups 
were created to promote a common response in (i) protection, (ii) assistance and basic 
services98, and (iii) early recovery. A cluster approach has been adopted in these 
thematic groups and sub-groups.99  
 DG ECHO, as recommended by the Good Humanitarian Donorship and the 
European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid,100 has supported this mechanism by being 
the only donor to participate, albeit as an observer, and by funding interventions under 
its cluster approach.  
 
However, neither this mechanism nor any other initiative has allowed a division of 
labour between donors, for several reasons: 
 The National Humanitarian Plenary Coordination mechanism ceased to exist with the 
dissolution of Acción Social, but by the end of the evaluation period the APC, created 
in November 2011, had still to fully take up its coordinating role in international 
cooperation. 
 While the IASC has been in place the Humanitarian Coordinator has remained weak. 
Indeed the GoC has not so far allowed the UN to launch a Consolidated Appeal 
Process (CAP). A CAP involves the drafting of a Common Humanitarian Action Plan 
and allows not only international NGOs, UN agencies and the Red Cross Movement, 
but also donors, to work closely together. This process favours a division of labour as 
donors can decide which project to fund under the action plan or in which sector or 
geographical zone they wish to intervene.101 The GoC is opposed to this type of appeal 
because it gives more visibility to the conflict and may therefore hinder its capacity to 
                                                 
97  It is headed by the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and is composed of nine agencies of the UN system as well as 
nine international NGOs. The Red Cross Movement participates as an observer and DG ECHO is the only donor to 
participate in the Committee also as an observer. 
98  This thematic group is itself divided into four sub-groups: WASH, Food, Education and Health. 
99  For further information on the division of labour among the different organisations and for the leader of each group 
see http://www.colombiassh.org/site/spip.php?article172. 
100  “The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid” (OJ C 25, 30.1.2008), p. 8. 
101  A Country Humanitarian Framework has been under preparation for two years but had not yet been used for a CAP 
process at the end of the evaluation period. 
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attract development and investment funding. Furthermore it may be interpreted by the 
international community as a lack of GoC capacity to fulfill its responsibilities.  
 No formal space for the coordination of humanitarian donors exists. There are only a 
few humanitarian donors, yet they have so far not divided up responsibilities for the 
humanitarian response they provide to the Colombian crisis.102 It should be noted that: 
- El Grupo de Cooperantes, a formal group of development partners in which the 
EUD participates, meets on a monthly basis but no humanitarian issues are 
addressed within this group; 
- in recent months the DG ECHO office in Colombia has invited donors to 
participate in the regular consultations it organises with its implementing partners 
but it is too soon to make any assessment of this initiative, in particular whether it 
is a step in the direction of a division of labour between donors. 
Coherence and complementarities of DG ECHO interventions with those 
of other humanitarian actors (JC 6.3) 
Actions funded by DG ECHO were complementary to those of the GoC, notably in 
specific circumstances, viz.: 
 Where there were difficulties in accessibility: DG ECHO’s partners had indeed the 
capacity to enter zones and provide assistance where State agencies were not or could 
not be present. This was observed during visits to Tumaco, Puerto Libertador, Jambaló 
and Toribío. 
 Where there was a lack of capacity:  
- This was the case in the winter of 2010-2011 when regions of the country were 
flooded and DG ECHO planned additional interventions with a total budget of 
€2m in support of government action.  
- Another example relates to the gaps in humanitarian assistance delivered by the 
State in the wake of the institutional and legal reforms that followed President 
Santos’s election. As mentioned in Chapter 2 the new Victims Law has put the 
administrative burden on local authorities, UAOs, by requiring that they be 
responsible for assisting IDPs during the first 90 days of displacement before the 
new Victims Unit takes up longer-term assistance at national level. Over recent 
months local authorities have had problems coping with the flow of IDPs and 
registering them. This challenge was observed in the Department Capital of Cali 
where the UAO responsible for assisting IDPs regarded the support of the ICRC, 
DG ECHO’s implementing partner, as “fundamental”. 
 Where protection was needed: despite the constant changing conflict dynamics and 
the different parties to the conflict (traditional actors and more recent ones), 
international humanitarian organisations are rather well respected. As mentioned in the 
focus group of DG ECHO’s implementing partners, “international presence creates a space of 
protection”103, thanks notably to their strict adherence to the humanitarian principles of 
neutrality and independence.  
 
                                                 
102  These are according to FTS OCHA 2007-2012: Canada, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, and 
Sweden. The US is another very influential donor but its assistance consists primarily of military and police aid. 
103  Focus group organised by the evaluation team, Bogotá, 6 August 2012. 
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DG ECHO’s selection process for implementing partners and projects has fostered 
complementarity at intervention level.  
 
Indeed the selected case studies show that DG ECHO took into consideration the past 
experience of the implementing partners it selected in a certain region (FAO in Córdoba) 
or in a specific sector (ICRC in protection, UNHCR in assistance to refugees). Such an 
approach has allowed DG ECHO not only to benefit from the implementing partners’ 
expertise but also to create synergies with other projects implemented by them in a specific 
region or sector.  This type of consideration featured clearly in the Fichops of projects and 
could in some cases be witnessed in the field, examples being the coordination of the 
UNHCR with the WFP in provision of food and NFIs, and the coordination between the 
ICRC and the Colombian Red Cross in setting-up mobile health units. 
 
In addition, complementarity was a systematic selection criterion whenever DG ECHO 
staff at headquarters recommended, or decided not to recommend, a funding intervention 
(Fichops Section Recommendation by the Desk). 
 
Nevertheless DG ECHO’s focus on rural versus urban settings and its lack of 
flexibility over the length of projects have posed some difficulties for partners’ 
coordination efforts, viz.:  
 For a number of DG ECHO’s implementing partners the distinction between rural and 
urban settings is not relevant in the sense that humanitarian needs exist in both 
settings. DG ECHO’s traditional focus on remote rural areas has prevented partners 
from coming forward with projects targeting major urban centres even though these 
would have been complementary to DG ECHO’s actions.  
 The timeframe for DG ECHO’s projects is one year. Over the evaluation period, with 
the exception of the DIPECHO projects that lasted up to 18 months, none of the 
other projects lasted over 12 months.104 This lack of flexibility has hampered 
implementing partners in their efforts to link relief to rehabilitation.  
.  
                                                 
104  DG ECHO’s inventory (Cuadro Proyectos Plan Global 2008-2012) 
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Evaluation Question 7 on efficiency  
What were the major factors having an impact in the efficiency of the 
delivery of DG ECHO humanitarian assistance in the country? 
 
There are two key dimensions to efficiency: the timeliness and the cost-effectiveness with which support was 
delivered. In the context of humanitarian aid, efficiency may be more important than in other types of aid 
delivery in the sense that humanitarian assistance has to address acute basic needs or even protect the lives of 
people. Yet, while assessing the efficiency of humanitarian assistance, one must not lose sight of the 
challenging contexts in which, by definition, it operates. Conflicts or natural disasters at the origins of 
humanitarian crises often render the delivery of aid very difficult, restricting the scope for assistance in a 
timely and cost-effective manner.  
This question thus aims at assessing (i) whether DG ECHO’s interventions remained in line with 
planning and were cost-effective, (ii) whether specific (recurrent) factors “internal” to the European Union 
have enhanced or hampered the timeliness or cost-effectiveness of the delivery of humanitarian aid (e.g. 
procedures, human resources policy, distribution of roles in terms of institutional set-up), and (iii) whether 
(recurrent) factors related to the Colombian context have enhanced or hampered the timeliness or cost-
effectiveness of the delivery of humanitarian aid (e.g. capacities of counterparts, existence of zones that are 
difficult to access, security aspects, etc.). 
 
EQ 7 on efficiency  – Answer Summary Box 
The planning and costs of DG ECHO’s interventions had to be adjusted owing to 
unpredictable developments. While human resources have contributed to the efficient 
implementation of projects, the institutional set-up of the EU and the one-year 
timeframe of DG ECHO’s interventions have hampered synergies, potentially 
undermining the cost-effectiveness of individual projects. External factors such as 
insecurity and political measures have also undermined the efficiency of operations 
conducted by DG ECHO’s implementing partners. The legal and institutional changes 
introduced in 2011 have enhanced the efficiency of humanitarian assistance at political 
level by giving it legitimacy, but these changes have not yet been reflected at operational 
level. 
In several cases the planning and costs of DG ECHO’s interventions had to be adjusted to 
adapt them to unforeseen factors linked to security issues, changes in target populations, or 
unforeseen developments in the political context. The following elements could be observed in 
the selection of case studies:  
 On internal factors, while human resources – of DG ECHO and of its implementing 
partners - have contributed to efficient implementation of projects, the institutional set-up 
and the one-year timeframe have hampered efforts to create synergies, potentially 
undermining the cost-effectiveness of individual projects. 
 On external factors:  
- The lack of security caused by the constantly changing dynamic of the conflict has 
been a hampering factor over the whole evaluation period, notably through temporary 
prevention of access to regions.   
- The election of President Santos brought important institutional and legal changes that 
have created real opportunities for humanitarian assistance, but in the short term these 
changes have undermined the Colombian State’s capacity for humanitarian response, 
notably by putting a considerable administrative burden on the local authorities 
responsible for providing initial assistance to IDPs. Furthermore, the unchanged 
position on non-recognition of victims of BACRIMs and the sensitive issue of the 
visibility of the humanitarian crisis have remained limiting factors in the sense that the 
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first has prevented efficient collaboration with State institutions in addressing the needs 
of these victims, while the second has hampered the efficiency of UNHCR 
interventions targeting Colombian refugees in Ecuador.  
Timeliness and cost-effectiveness of DG ECHO’s interventions (JC 7.1) 
 Over the evaluation period there has been evidence that adjustments have had 
to be made in terms both of implementation schedules (even though the twelve-
month timeframe was never exceeded105) and of costs due to unpredictable 
factors. Only one of the five study cases selected – Save the Children UK in Medellin - 
did not require any adjustment in terms of budget or duration.106 With respect to the 
four other study cases, the reasons for revision varied, viz.: 
- FAO in the department of Córdoba: the time for execution of the intervention 
had to be extended by one month. This delay was caused by the moving of the 
FAO office from Monte Libano to Monteria for security reasons. 
- ICRC in the department of Valle del Cauca: the budget was not revised but 
the number of beneficiaries was lowered from 45,000 to 35,310. This difference 
was caused by a decrease in the demand for assistance for new IDPs in 2010, 
while the need for protection for resident populations increased. The ICRC 
wished to adapt to the needs of these different target populations. It also 
emphasised the difficulty of counting direct beneficiaries when assisting groups or 
families (see Box1 under EQ1). 
- Solidaridad Internacional in the department of Nariño: the intervention was 
delayed following outbreaks of violence and the worsening of the armed conflict 
in the project regions. 
- UNHCR in Ecuador: in this intervention the number of beneficiaries was also 
reduced. The reason was that the initial target had become too optimistic in the 
light of a change in procedure required by the GoE and which aimed at narrowing 
the criteria for registration as refugees.  
These adjustments resulted from the close monitoring implemented by DG 
ECHO. 
DG ECHO staff travelling to the different project regions undertook close field 
monitoring of interventions. DG ECHO has also maintained regular interactions with 
its implementing partners, both formally through the annual consultations, and 
informally. This was highly appreciated by the implementing partners who consider 
DG ECHO to be demanding as a donor but at the same time mindful of developments 
in the country and ready to adapt project targets in the light of the changing security 
situation or unforeseen needs: “One can come to ECHO office and explain the problems met for 
example the number of beneficiaries that is no longer the one foreseen. ECHO also comes to the field to 
verify what is happening and one can obtain changes as long as it is justified. ECHO is a very 
demanding donor which is good.”107 
                                                 
105  With the exception of six DIPECHO’s projects. 
106  This intervention could target more beneficiaries than initially planned but this was due to a difference in the 
exchange rate (SC-UK Fichop 2010, p.30) 
107  Focus group organized with implementing partners in Bogotá on 6 August 2012. 
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Factors having enhanced or hampered the timeliness or cost-
effectiveness of the delivery of humanitarian aid (JC 7.2 and 7.3) 
As DG ECHO does not intervene directly in Colombia, not only factors “internal” to the 
European Union but also factors related to its implementing partners impact on the 
efficiency of its action. Both are considered here: 
 While some improvements have been made in terms of procedures, the one-
year timeframe and the institutional set-up hampered efficiency.  
- Improved procedures: implementing partners stated during the focus group 
meeting that they estimated that the time required for approval of projects had 
decreased by almost 50% at the end of the evaluation period. A good project can 
now be approved within 15 days. This apparently was achieved less by the use of 
new software than by better-planned and earlier submission of projects. 
Furthermore reporting procedures have also been simplified by reducing the 
number of reports from three to two.  
- Institutional set-up: the division of work between DG ECHO’s office in 
Colombia and its headquarters office had no effect, according to implementing 
partners, on the undertaking of individual projects or even on changes to activities 
within these projects, which apparently could be achieved rather quickly. However 
the lack of concerted actions between DG ECHO’s office in Colombia and EUD. 
has hampered the creation of synergies between projects, potentially reducing 
their respective efficiency. For example, while the Peace Laboratories were 
successful one can question whether more could have been achieved by 
coordinating their work with DG ECHO’s relief work in the same conflict zones 
and building on DG ECHO’s expertise gained in Colombia since the mid-1990s. 
- One-year timeframe: the difficulty of creating synergies between projects was 
further compounded by the one-year timeframe of DG ECHO’s interventions. 
Despite the different factors requiring adjustments as described under JC7.1, none 
of the 123 interventions funded by the European Union between 2008 and 2012 
lasted more than a year.  As mentioned under EQ6 this lack of flexibility has 
hampered implementing partners in their effort to link relief to rehabilitation or 
even merely to create synergies between the different actions they undertook. 
Furthermore, stakeholders challenged the rationale for this one-year timeframe 
since funding of certain interventions was often renewed. 
 
 With respect to human resources, while it has been a factor of enhancement of 
efficiency over the evaluation period, concerns exist with respect to the next 
programming cycle and the possible reduction in human resources. As stated 
above, good and regular working relations have been established between the staff of 
the DG ECHO office in Colombia and the different implementing partners from all 
three families –UN, NGOs and ICRC. There is concern, however, that these resources 
might be reduced by the end of bilateral development cooperation, as called for by the 
Agenda for Change, and thus the difficult task of LRRD may be further undermined. 
 
 The capacity of implementing partners (notably their human resources) 
contributed to efficient implementation of interventions. There was evidence 
from the case studies selected that while some implementing partners were asked by 
DG ECHO to improve the quality of their reporting and their response to monitoring 
questions, none was criticized for the quality of their work. Indeed intervention 
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documents often mentioned their human resources as a contributory factor to good 
performance during the projects.  
 
 The political context up until 2010 and insecurity were two external factors that 
have hampered the efficiency of humanitarian assistance. 
Several aspects of the Uribe’s administration negatively impacted on the delivering of 
humanitarian assistance, viz.: 
- The intensification of the conflict in certain “consolidation regions”: the Uribe 
government launched in 2007 a National Plan for Territorial Consolidation. While 
this plan allowed the Colombian State to extent its control over the territory, it 
also meant that the violence increased in certain regions with humanitarian actors 
temporarily unable to access confined communities.108 The high number of IDPs 
from these zones reflect this intensification of the conflict. According to 
CODHES, 32,7% of the IDPs in 2010 were from the CCAI regions. The 
consolidation plan was no longer an issue in terms of the timely implementation 
of humanitarian projects at the end of the evaluation period.  
- The blurring of the civil-military distinction: In March 2009 the GoC approved 
Presidential Directive 001 as another tool of the Consolidation Plan. It was meant 
to “articulate” the efforts of civilians and military actors in strategic CCAI zones. 
This directive contributed to violating the international humanitarian law principle 
of distinction that is fundamental to humanitarian actors being able to conduct 
their work in total neutrality and independence during conflict. DG ECHO’s 
implementing partners, notably the UN agencies, opposed this directive at the 
time.109 
 
With respect to insecurity as a factor hampering efficiency, as noted in Chapter 2 the 
dynamic of conflict in Colombia is constantly changing, requiring humanitarian actors 
to adapt their projects or suspend them when violence intensifies in certain regions. In 
addition, even though the BACRIMs are not recognised by the GoC as a party to the 
internal conflict, their actions do have an impact on the humanitarian situation.110 
Analysts of the Colombian conflict stated in this respect: “The gravity of the violence 
perpetrated by the neo-paramilitaries or BACRIMs has been acknowledged late but each time with 
more clarity by the government and by analysts. Beyond the issue of their name, there is a consensus on 
the fact that these groups constitute the main threat to security in Colombia and this has been the case 
for over four years already.”111 
 
These actors have hampered humanitarian operations in two ways: first because of the 
difficult security conditions they have created in the country on a national scale; and 
second because of the indifference they have manifested in relation to the advocacy 
work conducted by humanitarian actors.  An ICRC representative explained:  « With 
the guerilla we can speak about protection; moreover if we have this type of discourse it means that we 
                                                 
108  The 14 zones concerned by the Plan, also known as CCAI (Centros de Coordinacion y Atencion Integral), included 86 
municipalities in 17 departments and represented 16,48% of the territorial extension of Colombia. CODHES, 
“¿Consolidación de Qué?” Boletín Informativo n°77, Bogotá, 15 February 2011. 
109  With respect to the registration of Colombian refugees in Ecuador, however, the task was easier. Indeed the 
diplomatic relations between Ecuador and Colombia were interrupted under the Uribe administration and the GoE 
positioned itself as the benefactor of Colombian refugees giving visibility to the humanitarian crisis. 
110  The BACRIMs have emerged as the group responsible for the greatest number of unilateral violent actions from 2007 
to 2010. 
111  Restrepo, Jorge et al., “Paramilitarismo: la amenaza sigue viva”, Razón Pública, 7 March 2011. 
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acknowledge them as being party to the conflict and not as terrorists. Whereas it is more complicated 
with the BACRIMs because they do not have a political approach.” 
 The legal and institutional changes following the election of President Santos 
have enhanced the efficiency of humanitarian assistance at the political level by 
giving it legitimacy, but these changes have not yet been reflected at 
operational level. In addition, they have in the short term undermined the 
Colombian State’s capacity for humanitarian response. Finally, the sensitive 
issue of the visibility of the humanitarian crisis has also been and remains a 
limiting factor. 
President Santos has not only acknowledged the existence of an internal conflict, he 
has also recognised the importance of addressing the rights of victims with the passing 
of the Victims Law in 2011 and the creation of the Victims Unit. These political and 
legal changes have been paramount in the efficiency of humanitarian assistance in the 
sense that humanitarian actors have been able in recent months to collaborate 
efficiently with public authorities and redirect IDPs and victims of the conflict to the 
relevant public institutions, notably the UAOs, after first alleviating their basic needs. 
Indeed in the field they had to be active on both fronts, on the one hand helping 
victims in claiming assistance, and on the other supporting local authorities in 
addressing the victims’ needs.  
 
Indeed the changes that have taken place at political level have not yet been reflected 
at operational level for the reasons already mentioned. Furthermore, new protection 
needs arose with the implementation of the Victims Law. This is the case for 
community leaders helping victims claim their lands. The procedure for claiming land 
is a lengthy process and this has created tensions with which humanitarian actors have 
had to cope. Finally, even though the GoC has recognised the existence of the conflict, 
the visibility of the humanitarian crisis remains a sensitive issue. As noted under EQ6, 
it is for precisely this reason that the GoC has been unwilling to launch a CAP that 
would improve the efficiency of the humanitarian actions undertaken by the 
international community. According to a UNHCR representative visibility is also a 
factor that has contributed to the reduced number of Colombians registered as 
refugees in Ecuador since the two countries normalised their diplomatic relations.  
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5. Summary of main conclusions 
Conclusion 1:  On DG ECHO’s prioritisation of humanitarian needs 
DG ECHO support tackled the right priorities in terms of humanitarian 
needs in Colombia 
 
To identify the humanitarian needs in Colombia and build its strategy, DG ECHO relied 
on needs assessments conducted by its implementing partners, the validity of which was 
generally accepted. These assessments identified different categories of disaster and 
conflict-affected populations, namely IDPs, confined communities and refugees and 
asylum seekers, all of which were targeted by DG ECHO (even if some categories were not 
fully covered, as explained under conclusion 2). For these populations, DG ECHO 
concentrated its support on the so-called ‘basic needs’, as defined by SPHERE standards 
and non-emergency needs. Moreover, DG ECHO’s follow-up of the Colombian context 
and its close monitoring of its interventions, allowed it to adapt its support to needs arising 
from unforeseen contextual changes.  
Conclusion 2:  On unregistered IDPs and PNIPs 
Some populations that were in need and did not receive any 
humanitarian support remained out of reach, or partially out of reach, of 
DG ECHO’s support, as an indirect consequence of DG ECHO’s 
implementing partner choices in terms of eligibility criteria 
 
This conclusion concerns two types of populations: unregistered IDPs in large urban areas 
beyond the 90 day limit, and the increasing number of PNIPs that were unable to obtain 
refugee status. Indeed, a large part of DG ECHO budget in Colombia has been channelled 
through ICRC to assist IDPs, either in large urban settings or rural zones. In big urban 
centres, support was focused on recently displaced persons (less than 3 months). This 
approach was based on the assumption that in big cities longer term support would be 
provided by the Colombian State. However, unregistered IDPs were not eligible for 
support by the Colombian State. Hence, in the end they could benefit from support of 
neither DG ECHO nor the Colombian State. Furthermore, it cannot be assumed that after 
three months the needs of these populations can be addressed by development 
programmes. Similarly, to benefit from support from the Ecuadorian State, PNIPs needed 
to be granted the refugee status. DG ECHO has addressed the needs of PNIPs through 
the UNHCR. The UNHCR focused its support on asylum seekers and refugees, even 
though ‘unregistered’ refugees could benefit from community-based support, with smaller 
budgets allocated. Hence ‘unregistered’ refugees fell out of reach of support of the 
Ecuadorian State and partially out of reach for DG ECHO support. This was further 
aggravated by the fact that the Ecuadorian legislation on refugees and asylum seekers has 
narrowed the criteria of eligibility for the recognition of the refugee status so that an 
increasing number of these refugees remain unregistered.   
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Conclusion 3:  On the timeliness of DG ECHO’s response 
On the whole, emergency response was provided in a timely manner, in 
particular, ECHO responded quickly to the natural disasters of 2007 and 
2010. The one year timeframe created some constraints in particular 
cases. 
 
Overall stakeholders agree that DG ECHO support was swift and provided in a timely 
manner. This included also DG ECHO addressing the urgent humanitarian needs arising 
from the severe flooding in 2007 and 2010 via two ad hoc budgeting decisions specifically 
targeting flood victims.  
However, a lack of flexibility on project length was also felt by implementing partners as a 
constraint on coordination efforts and on the linking of relief to rehabilitation and 
development in some cases. 
Conclusion 4:  On linking relief, rehabilitation and development 
DG ECHO integrated LRRD in its strategy over the evaluation period 
and implemented hand-over strategies successfully at implementation 
level. Nevertheless, LRRD was hampered by the armed conflict and the 
fact that the government is a party to the conflict. There were also 
missed opportunities regarding linkages with the Commission’s 
development programmes.  
 
DG ECHO’s approach to promote LRRD was based on two pillars: a handover strategy to 
local actors and enhancing complementarities with Commission development programmes. 
All DG ECHO’s global plans and HIPs for Colombia explicitly devise an approach to 
ensure LRRD. The evaluation also observed specific success in terms of connecting DG 
ECHO’s support to longer term assistance. There were also examples of DG ECHO 
handing over projects to local actors. However, governments of recipient countries have a 
key role to play in terms of linking the relief and development assistance received. This is 
much more difficult and challenging in armed conflicts especially when the government is a 
party to the conflict. In addition, while DG ECHO and the development services of the 
Commission both committed to adopt an LRRD approach in their strategic planning, 
notably by developing existing complementarities, they did not design their strategy jointly 
nor implement their actions in concert. The suppression of the Uprooted People thematic 
budget line in 2006 further complicated the establishment of connections between the two 
organisations. Nevertheless, DG ECHO has been able to successfully implement hand-
over and exit strategies. 
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Conclusion 5:  On interventions in urban settings 
Humanitarian consequences of urban violence, notably the need for 
protection, called for the intervention of humanitarian donors such as 
DG ECHO. When DG ECHO intervened in urban settings it showed 
specific types of assets.  
 
Based on relevant criteria measuring the humanitarian consequences of urban violence, the 
mandate to intervene for humanitarian organizations is fulfilled and compatible with DG 
ECHO’s mandate. DG ECHO’s interventions in urban contexts addressed the right needs, 
were complementary to the Government of Colombia’s activities, contributed to increased 
accountability on the part of government authorities, and generated incentives for the 
improvements in of non-discriminatory services. Morevover, there is a clear added-value 
for DG ECHO to support humanitarian protection interventions providing alternative 
humanitarian space and enhanced access in identified urban communities. Finally, DG 
ECHO’s community-based and ‘cash & voucher’ approaches have also proved useful. 
Conclusion 6:  On donor coordination 
DG ECHO was in a position to play a leading role in terms of 
coordination and of enhancing coherence and complementarities among 
humanitarian actors. However it did not fully take up this role notably 
because it was not in its mandate. Nevertheless, complementarities were 
achieved at implementation level 
 
Among the humanitarian donors, DG ECHO was the most important actor in terms of 
financial volume of its aid over the evaluation period. This confers DG ECHO with a 
potential leverage to play a key role in terms of coordination. At policy level, DG ECHO 
did play a supporting role in UN OCHA’s efforts to set up a common humanitarian 
support framework.  
At the implementation level, the inclusion of synergy-potential as a project selection 
criterion proved effective, but the one year time limit on DG ECHO engagements capped 
the level of coordination that could be developed within this framework.  
Conclusion 7:  On factors affecting timeliness and cost-effectiveness 
Timeliness and cost-effectiveness have been impacted by both ‘internal’ 
and ‘external’ factors.  
 
The consolidation plan adopted in 2007 caused the intensification of violence in certain 
regions but this is no longer an issue for the timely implementation of humanitarian 
projects. The adoption of the Presidential Decree in 2009 blurring civilian and military 
distinction led to project delays with some implementing partners. There were also missed 
opportunities in terms of concerted action between DG ECHO and the EUD where EUD 
could have built on DG ECHO expertise gained in Colombia since the mid-nineties, which 
would have benefited the efficiency of implementation. 
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES IN COLOMBIA ADE 
Final Report November 2012 Page 66 
Conclusion 8:  On estimation of coverage 
Estimation of coverage is very difficult both because there was no 
consensus on the number of IDPs and because DG ECHO only 
monitored beneficiary populations reached in an aggregated manner.  
 
There were several reasons behind the lack of consensus on the number of IDPs in 
Colombia over the evaluation period:  
 The Government does not recognize victims of BACRIMs and thus these are not 
counted; 
 Different organisations use different databases; 
 Specific difficulties apply when trying to obtain the exact number of beneficiaries of 
multi-donor interventions or operations conducted through UN agencies; 
 The fact that persons who have been repeatedly displaced are not counted (cannot 
benefit from support again); 
 The difficulty of counting direct beneficiaries when speaking of massive displacements; 
 Victims that wish to remain anonymous or those that do not know how to register.  
While DG ECHO provides disaggregated figures on targets at the planning stage, the 
monitoring of beneficiaries reached is not undertaken according to the same indicators.  
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6. Recommendations  
Areas where DG ECHO may provide an added value in the coming 1-3 
years: 
 
1. Increase coverage of IDPs in the short-term: The passing of the Victims Law, 
the institutional restructuration and high turnover of government officials in 
Colombia mean that there will be a transition period before Colombian 
government authorities can fulfil its responsibilities with regard to IDPs. Given the 
size of its presence in Colombia, DG ECHO would be well placed to provide 
additional support to IDPs during this transition period. This would, however, 
require increased funding for humanitarian actions in Colombia during this 
timeframe. The evaluation recommends that this option is given consideration, 
both in response to the transition-phase needs outlined above, and the need for 
urban interventions outlined in recommendations 8-12 below. 
2. Increase coverage of non-registered IDPs in Colombia and non-registered 
PNIPs in neighbouring countries: As outlined in Conclusion 2 above, there are 
significant numbers of non-registered IDPs in Colombia who are not served by the 
authorities, e.g., victims of BACRIMs or those who cannot address the 
Government of Colombia through fear of discrimination or lack of neutrality. 
Currently the needs of these IDPs are addressed during 90 days even though they 
remain in a critical humanitarian situation beyond this time limit.  In addition, the 
recent restrictions on the registration of refugees in neighbouring countries have 
created an increased number of non-registered PNIPs unable to access assistance 
from neighbouring governments and UNHCR. DG ECHO should consider ways 
to increase the share of DG ECHO support to non-registered victims both within 
Colombia and in neighbouring countries in order to increase coverage of groups 
not reached by the authorities or other international organisations. 
 
The main improvements to be considered by ECHO in future actions: 
 
3. Improve monitoring of DG ECHO coverage: The challenges of estimating 
coverage of target populations, as outlined in Conclusion 8 above (see also EQ 1 
and EQ 3), make it difficult to track the percentage of IDPs, refugees, confined 
communities or victims of natural disaster that have been covered by DG ECHO 
operations. In order to better monitor DG ECHO’s efficiency in reaching its 
strategic targets, and thus to inform future planning, a review of data collection 
procedures should be considered. In particular, it is recommended that DG ECHO 
seeks to build a consolidated database of persons supported by DG ECHO funded 
operations, cross-referenced against the share of DG ECHO support provided for 
multi-donor engagements.   
4. Enhance LRRD by increased coordination with the development services of 
the European Commission: As noted under conclusion 5 above, DG ECHO and 
the Commission’s development services both committed to adopt an LRRD 
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approach in their strategic planning. However, the evaluation finds that they did 
not design their strategies jointly nor implement their actions in concert. It is 
recommended that, as part of its commitment to LRRD, DG ECHO increases 
dialogue and coordination with the Commission development services, not only at 
the strategic level, but also in terms of project-level knowledge-sharing. The 
evaluators acknowledge that this is a joint responsibility and that it may be difficult 
regarding Commission development programmes channelled through Budget 
Support, but nevertheless improved consultation and coordination could be 
achieved regarding the use of instruments such as, for example, the Instrument for 
Stability and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights.  
 
 
Measures to reinforce DG ECHO coordination with partners and other 
donors: 
 
5. DG ECHO should exploit the added-value that it has in pushing for 
coordination. DG ECHO was the most important humanitarian donor financially, 
the EU has committed to stronger coordination, and DG ECHO has had a key 
role in keeping humanitarian needs visible. These aspects confer DG ECHO an 
added-value in coordinating humanitarian assistance even though it does not have 
such mandate. DG ECHO should therefore exploit such added-value especially in 
the transition period before the new institutions of the Colombian government can 
play their leading role in this respect. 
 
6. Support coordination efforts of UNHCR in neighbouring countries: The 
absence of a cluster system in Ecuador created a need for increased coherence and 
complementarity between humanitarian actors dealing with the Colombian refuges 
and asylum seekers in this country. The evaluation recommends that DG ECHO 
supports efforts by UNHCR to set up a mechanism for coherence and 
complementarity with other partners such as the joint WFP, UNHCR, OXFAM 
project.  
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DG ECHO’s potential role in urban violent contexts: 
 
7. Using DG ECHO’s leverage to draw attention to the need for interventions 
in urban settings. As noted in Conclusion 6, there are significant and growing 
needs for humanitarian interventions in urban settings. The evaluation finds that 
there is a sustained need for support in this respect: different stakeholders call for a 
‘neutral’ actor to provide this support; it would be in line with ECHO’s mandate; 
and ECHO has proved through past interventions that it had specific types of 
assets in this respect.  Given DG ECHO’s role as a major humanitarian donor in 
Colombia, the evaluation therefore recommends that it seeks to shape the 
humanitarian agenda and draw attention to the needs for interventions in urban 
settings. It should start to build up institutional know-how on its interventions in 
urban settings in the region in particular in the field of Protection. That could 
provide DG ECHO with an edge on addressing upcoming humanitarian trends and 
demonstrate leadership at national, regional and global levels. To achieve this, DG 
ECHO resources would have to be increased to address the urban humanitarian 
needs portfolio whilst maintaining the rural portfolio, which cannot be curtailed. 
8. Consider increasing funding for support in urban contexts: in addition to the 
advocacy role outlined in recommendation 8 above, the evaluation also 
recommends that DG ECHO consider increasing its portfolio of activities in urban 
areas, whilst simultaneously maintaining its vital support in rural areas. 
Consequently, the evaluation recommends that DG ECHO considers increasing 
the funding available for humanitarian support to Colombia, with the additional 
funding being prioritised for support to victims of violence in urban contexts. 
Further, the evaluation recommends that DG ECHO explores the different 
available approaches when considering DG ECHO operations in urban contexts, 
including the following points as a starting point for discussion:  
 Explore a sectoral approach to Protection in urban contexts: as discussed 
in EQ5 above, the question of establishing DG ECHO’s mandate to act in 
urban contexts is a complex one, even if the needs are clearly present. One way 
to move forward in this regard would be to consider a sectoral approach to 
Protection, using commonly identified violence indicators as a trigger for a 
humanitarian response, in a similar way that DG ECHO approaches sectoral 
needs.  
 Learn from best practice in providing humanitarian support in urban 
settings: as noted in EQ5, there are indications that specific interventions in 
urban settings by DG ECHO’s partners (e.g., ECHO House in Medellin or 
UNHCR’s WATSAN interventions in Ecuador) have contributed to the 
increased accountability on the part of government authorities and generated 
incentives for the improvement of non-discriminatory public services. The 
evaluation recommends that DG ECHO draws lessons on these and similar 
interventions in urban settings that have proved to be quite effective in terms 
of LRRD and provision of indiscriminate access to basic services. 
 Facilitate discussions on the use of “cash & voucher” approaches: as 
discussed in EQ5 above, the growing use of cash & voucher approaches by 
DG ECHO’s partners has proven well-adapted to the emergency response to 
IDPs and PNIPs in urban contexts. The evaluation therefore recommends that 
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DG ECHO facilitates technical discussions among its implementing partners 
to draw lessons-learned, strengthen coherence and coordination in this regard. 
9. DG ECHO should engage further in Protection interventions in urban 
settings. DG ECHO should strive to address protection needs in urban settings of 
victims excluded by the Victims Law, especially Children and Youth. It should do 
so by creating alternative humanitarian spaces and strengthening the so-called 
“Attention or Protection Roads”. It should geographically base its interventions on 
relevant criteria measuring humanitarian consequences of urban violence. 
 
Improving DG ECHO’s actions addressing humanitarian needs of 
vulnerable groups: 
 
10. Continue supporting the community/neighbourhood approach to basic 
needs support: As noted in EQ3 and EQ5, some of DG ECHO’s interventions in 
urban environments have used a community approach to basic needs support, which has 
proven successful in preventing further discrimination and allowing identification 
of Protection cases among vulnerable groups, including in particular children and 
adolescents at risk of forced recruitment or abuse. The evaluation recommends that 
this approach is continued and prioritised in future support in urban contexts 
whenever appropriate. 
11. DG ECHO should continue to encourage implementing partners to have a 
differentiated approach to vulnerable groups: Specific risks of discrimination 
arise for vulnerable groups, particularly in urban contexts. Accordingly, the 
evaluation recommends that DG ECHO should continue to encourage its 
implementing partners in designing interventions that have a differentiated 
approach to indigenous communities, Afro-Colombians, women, elders and 
disabled, in order not to reproduce discrimination and exclusion schemes. 
 
 
 
